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ABSTRACT
The possible effects of external imagery in televised political 
campaign advertising upon our electoral system, coupled with the 
current public interest in this area, could lead to a call for 
legislation restricting televised political advertisements to a 
"talking head" format.
This study found that a statute regulating televised political 
campaign advertisements in this manner would violate the first 
amendment to the United States Constitution.
The regulation of external imagery would not be a valid time, 
place and manner restriction because external imagery is compatible 
with messages on the television medium and the regulation of external 
imagery would not be content-neutral.
It is unlikely that the courts would find the regulation to be a 
valid content-based restriction because a compelling government 
interest does not exist.
This study concludes that the best solution to the problems 
presented by external imagery in televised political advertising is 
not for government intervention, but for the citizens and the press 
to be actively involved in political affairs.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
David Ogilvy, the famous advertising copywriter, once remarked, "the day will 
come when candidates are elected by polls, rather than polling booths."1 Ogilvy 
understood advertising’s influence over public perception, so it did not surprise him 
that candidates would use this power to achieve their political ends.
Over the past forty years, candidates have become media literate and televised 
presidential campaign advertising has evolved into a useful, sophisticated and sometimes 
controversial campaign tool.
Recently, popular interest in this area has increased dramatically and a large 
number of magazine articles, dealing exclusively with televised political campaign 
advertisements, have appeared.2 This popular interest has caused many citizens to 
become polarized in their views on this topic.3 Supporters of televised presidential 
campaign advertising claim that these ads offer tremendous advantages to political
1 R. SPERO, THE DUPING OF THE AMERICAN VOTER 20 (1980).
2
A check of The Reader's Guide to Periodical Llt.erat.ur-e shows that in 1952, the year televised spot 
advertising began, there were no articles published that dealt specifically with this form of advertising; 
however in 1988, 28 such articles appeared. These articles are representative of the increased interest and 
concern among the lay public with televised political advertising.
3
L. KAID, D. NIMMO, & K. SANDERS, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICAL ADVERTISING. 108, (1986).
2campaigns.4 Proponents argue that political ads are a practical application of the 
repetition research in brand-name advertising, have a low cost-per-thousand price and 
can reach undecideds and nonsupporters rather than only those voters already in favor 
of a candidate.5
While this form of advertising does have its supporters, others are questioning 
its effect on our electoral system.6 One of the main concerns about televised political 
advertising involves the imagery in these ads. Critics are concerned that televised 
political advertising is becoming mQre image than information and that this is 
damaging our democratic process.7
Discussing image in paid political spot advertising is difficult, in part, because 
the concept of image is often used in two legitimate, but categorically different ways.8 
One method of defining image involves examining image in terms of the internal 
characteristics of the candidate. In other words, what does the candidate’s presentation 
style and use of non-verbal language tell viewers about the candidate’s character?9 
While these attributes may have power over the voter’s perception of the candidate, 
they are too deeply attached to the candidate’s personality to be practically regulated
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Diamond, A Candidate for All Channels. 5 AM. FILM 28, 32 (1980).
7
Zuckerman, The Made-for-TV Campaign, 103 TIME 66, (1988).
3
KAID, NIMMO & SANDERS, supra note 3 at 113.
9
Id. at 114.
3by law. This definition of image will be beyond the scope of this thesis.
It is the second definition of image that this thesis will be concerned with. 
Under this definition, image is seen in terms of external factors.10 Image in this 
sense distinguishes between straight "talk-to-the-camera" formats of internal image and 
the more complex production techniques of external image which use still and moving 
pictures, fast cutting, music and symbolism in an effort to define and shape a 
candidate’s image. External image is the use of image techniques external or outside 
of the candidate in order to shape or define a candidate’s image.
The possible effects of external imagery upon our electoral system, coupled with 
the current public interest in this area, could lead to a call for the regulation of 
external imagery in televised presidential campaign advertising.
Regulating political advertising has always been difficult for lawmakers because 
attempts to regulate it often violate the first amendment of the United States 
Constitution. This thesis will examine from a legal perspective whether legislation 
restricting televised political advertisments to a "talking head" format would be 
constitutionally permissible.
10
Id. at 113.
5CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Before the specific topic of this thesis can be explored, some background 
information on imagery and televised presidential campaign advertising is required.
This section will explore the development of televised presidential campaign advertising 
and the current legal limitations and protections upon its content. This section will 
conclude with a summary of the studies on imagery in political advertisements and the 
legislative response to this problem.
I.The Development o f  Televised Presidential Campaign Advertising
A.Early History
The use of televised presidential campaign advertising can be traced to the early 
days of the broadcast industry. In the beginning, radio broadcasts had corporate 
sponsors, but no direct advertising was allowed on the radio.11 During the 1920’s 
broadcasters began selling short spaces of time to advertisers and it was not long 
before politicians saw an opportunity to reach potential voters. In 1924, presidential 
candidates John W. Davis (Democrat) and Calvin Coolidge (Republican) bought radio
Diamond & Bates, The Last H u r r a h  21 NEW YORK 31, 36 (1988).
6time in order to broadcast their speeches. The Republicans spent $120,000 on radio 
and the Democrats spent $40,000. The Republicans won.12
The first political spots were broadcast four years later when the Republicans 
organized 6,000 ‘Minute Men’ from all over the country to present brief radio talks 
on behalf of the Republican ticket. Scripts were sent in advance, so that the same 
talk was given nationwide on a particular day.13
Motion pictures were used in 1934 to carry phony newsreels of staged events. 
These crude experiments became the model for the televised political campaign
commercial when television rose to prominence during the early 1950’s.14 Following
World War II, the television industry grew and it was not long before political parties 
saw that television was the future of political campaigning.15
The first use of the television commercial for political purposes was during the
Eisenhower campaign of 1952. Eisenhower’s campaign staff found through a Gallup 
poll that Americans were most concerned about the war in Korea, corruption in
I d . at 36.
13
I d .
14
See, Mitchell, How Media Politics was Born 39 AM. HERITAGE 34 (1988). In 1934, auckrakec Upton 
Sinclair was a Democratic candidate for governor In California. Conservatives saw Sinclair's program to end 
poverty as a Bolshevik plan to re-dlstrlbute wealth. These conservatives hired an ad agency and Whitaker and 
Barter (America's first political consulting firm) to produce these newsreels. One spot featured a "bum", 
getting off a train in California and saying "Sinclair says he will take the property of working people and 
give it to us." These spots were shown in movie theaters between features thanks to Louis B. Mayer, head of 
MGM studios and a power In the California Republican party. Id.
15
C.THOMPSON, TELEVISION AND PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS: THE EXPERIENCE IN 1952 AND THE PROBLEMS AHEAD 4 
(1956). Television coverage of the 1948 Republican convention demonstrated that television would have an 
impact on how campaigns were run. Politicians, who were conscious of a new, larger, unfamiliar, and 
unpredictable audience, arranged the convention's itinerary so that the dull items would be disposed of during 
the day and important events would fall during the televised evening hours. I d .
7Washington and inflation.16 In order to grab the public’s attention, a series of 
television commercials were developed based on these three themes. Once developed, 
these commercials saturated the east and midwest17 for three weeks.18
According to Ben Duffy, one of the ad men on the campaign, "the approach 
was one of merchandising Eisenhower’s frankness, honesty, and integrity."19 Through 
these commercials, the Republicans sought to reach the non-voter and not necessarily 
the vote-switcher.20
While Eisenhower used the television medium effectively, his Democratic 
opponent Adlai Stevenson found adapting to television difficult. While Eisenhower was 
simplifying his messages in order to appeal to a television audience, Stevenson seemed 
to be "more concerned with the literary quality of his speeches, than with the 
projection of himself over television."21
Television played a substantial role in the 1956 presidential elections22 and was 
one of the primary reasons that Eisenhower decided to run for re-election.23 The
16
SPERO, supra note 1 at 35.
17
Elsenhower's support was weakest in these areas.
18
See SPERO, supra note 1, for a detailed exaeination of Eisenhower's campaign.
19
Spero, supra note 1 at 35.
20
Thompson, supra note -15 at 59.
21
B. RUBIN, POLITICAL TELEVISION 34 (1967).
22
Allen, Our First "Television Candidate; Elsenhower over Stevenson in 1956 65 JOURNALISM Q- 352 
(1988). (An examination of the impact of television on the 1956 Presidential campaign).
23
Id at 354. According to Allen, Eisenhower, who was recovering from a heart attack in 1955, doubted 
whether he had the physical ability to endure the demands of heavy campaign traveling. with television, 
Elsenhower could reach a large number of voters without traveling and would only need to travel to critical
8election of 1956 was a watershed year which changed the entire nature of Presidential 
campaigning. One of the reasons for this change was the growth of television. In 
1952, television was seen in only 37% of American homes, by approximately only 50 
million people.24
However, by 1956 television had grown dramatically and was now reaching 76% of 
American homes in all 48 states. An additional 60 million people were able to watch 
presidential politics for the first time.25 Another reason that television was important 
in 1956 was that it allowed candidates to end the "whistle stop" campaign.26
While the Republican party was effectively learning how to use this new 
technology, the Democrats were still having a difficult time adapting to television.27 
The emerging importance of television to the presidential campaign of 1956 caused 
both Republicans and Democrats to take a closer look at this new technology and to
areas. Id.
26
Id at 355. According to Allen, the "whistle stop" campaign was a political mainstay from at least 
1928 through 1952. Whistle stopping was more than just a campaign tradition, it gave voters lasting in-person 
impressions. The physical presence of presidential candidates was seen as an offering to grass-roots party 
leaders, who returned the favor with a broad-based local support for the candidate. With the introduction of 
high-speed aircraft and television, whistle stopping was abandoned for "surgical" campaigning in which personal 
time was reserved for critical areas and television was utilized for broad appeal and support. Id.
27
Id at 356. According to Allen, the Democrats had difficulty raising the funds necessary to use 
television and had a difficult time finding advertising agencies (who did not want to offend their Republican 
clients) to represent them. Perhaps the worst problem that the Democrats faced was the inability of Democratic 
candidate Adlai Stevenson to adapt to television. Stevenson refused to read a speech from a teleprompter and 
often lost his place in the speech. He often did not finish a speech on time and would just fade to black.
9re-examine their campaigning techniques.28
The 1960 election was a strange time in the development of televised 
presidential campaign advertising. By 1960, television had penetrated into most 
American homes and the political use of television for presidential campaigning had 
become accepted practice. The Republicans were learning to use television effectively 
in order to achieve their ends while the Democrats were beginning to see the necessity 
of including television in their campaign strategy.
The use of television advertising for campaign purposes was not without its 
detractors.29 Criticism of televised presidential campaign advertising dramatically 
affected Richard Nixon in 1960. Nixon was one of the early masters of political 
marketing. In the California Senate race of 1950, for example, Nixon won by a 
landslide after distributing his notorious "pink sheet” in order to discredit his opponent 
Helen Gahagan Douglas.30 While Nixon believed in the power of television, the
One attempt to use television advertising to cluunge Stevenson's "egg head" image and make him 
identifiable to the common man, came in Stevenson's "Man from Libertyville" spot. This spot showed Stevenson, 
his son and his daughter-in-law, carrying groceries into the candidate's farmhouse. Stevenson pauses at the 
door still holding his grocery bags and discusses the high cost of living. After he gives his speech, the 
daughter-in-law takes the bag from Stevenson and says kiddingly, "You're a big help." Stevenson replied with 
a chuckle,"Oh, I forgot to deliver the groceries and made a speech instead."
29
V. PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS 175 (1957) With the increased use of television technology by 
Presidential candidates, many Americans were concerned about the effects of television on the political process. 
In a 1956 issue of the Nation's rnmlness. a magazine published by the United States Chamber of Commerce, a 
prediction was made: "Both parties will merchandise their candidates and issues by the same methods that
business has developed to sell goods. These include scientific selection of appeals; planned repetition. . .
No flag waving faithfuls will parade the streets. Instead corps of volunteers will ring doorbells and 
telephones. . . candidates need in addition to rich voice and good dictation, to be able to look sincerely at
the T .V . camera." Id.
Comment, Misrepresentation in Political Advertising: The Role of Legal Sanctions. 36 EMORY L.J. 
853, 856 (1987).
10
emerging controversy regarding televised political advertising caused him to fear having 
the "Madison Avenue” label attached to him.
Originally Nixon had planned to carry his message to the American voter 
through the most imaginative use of television ever displayed in a national campaign.31 
To do this, Nixon had enlisted the aid of some of the brightest and most talented 
men in the field.32 These top-level planners and volunteers assumed that they would 
be allowed to experiment with the medium, so they designed a campaign "to use the 
medium as it had never been used before.”33 However, because of the public concern 
over televised political advertising, Nixon could not bring himself to either approve or 
disapprove the plans of his television advisors.34 As Nixon’s television advisors 
watched the progress of the 1960 campaign, it became apparent that Nixon was 
ignoring them and was not going to use their ideas.35 In the end, from July 25-the 
night of Nixon’s acceptance speech in Chicago- until October 25, three months went 
by in which Nixon did not appear on television with control over the circumstances.
31 T. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT-1960 3X2 (X961).
32
Id. at 312.
33
Id .
34
I d . According to White, Nixon feared the "Madison Avenue" label so much that be moved bis television 
advisors, some of the finest brains of New York's advertising agencies, into an unmarked office on Vanderbilt 
Avenue in New York, one block east of Madison Avenue, in order to avoid this label. Id.
35
Id. at 313. The fact that they were being ignored and their elaborate work was going to die a 
"still death," cause a considerable amount of discontent among the advisors. According to one of the directors, 
"You could have taken the key to the Republican National Committee, locked the door, thrown the key into the 
Potomac, shipped all hundred and seventy-five employees off to the Virgin Islands and saved money-for all that 
he ever listened to us." Id. Another member said, "We used to meet for strategy sessions at the University 
Club— and we were like ten guys in a house of mirrors entrancing each other. We satisfied each other with how 
smart we were-but nobody could get through to Dick." Id.
Many experts believe this cost him the election. Nixon’s only commercial during the 
campaign showed Nixon as the strong "cold warrior." In this "talking head" spot, 
Nixon declared, "We must never let the Communists think we are weak . . . And so 
I say, let’s not tear America down. Let us speak up for America."
John Kennedy, on the other hand, had learned from his party’s mistakes in the 
1950’s and developed a plan for using television to create a positive image of himself. 
Kennedy became a master of imagery. He flew instead of driving so that he could 
get dramatic television coverage of enthusiastic crowds waiting to greet him at 
airports.36 He also exercised a tremendous amount of control over the film PT 109. 
which told the story of John Kennedy, the war hero. This movie had a tremendous 
impact on the public’s perception of Kennedy.37 Once president, Kennedy would also 
be quick to cancel any prerecorded films which showed him in an unfavorable light.38
According to Joseph Benny, author of John F. Kennedy and the Media: The 
First Television President. "In Marshall McLuhan’s terms, Kennedy can be perceived 
as a cool candidate on a cool medium-television. Knowing the effect of television on 
politicking, he took full advantage of it. Campaigning for president, Kennedy 
demonstrated a futuristic understanding of television."39
"The timing of his (Kennedy’s) half-hour shows," according to Theodore
a. BENNY, JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE MEDIA: THE FIRST TELEVISION PRESIDENT 24 (1987).
12
Sorensen, a campaign insider on Kennedy’s campaign, "was carefully selected with an 
eye to what programs would be displaced, thus displeasing their fans. Five minute 
spot presentations were also strategically placed at the end of popular shows."40
Kennedy used television to achieve three goals: to become a nationally 
recognized political figure; to prove that a Catholic could be elected president by 
discussing the issue openly; and to show that despite his youth, he was not "too 
inexperienced."41 One spot that Kennedy used to address the Catholic issue had a 
young Kennedy with a microphone in his hand declaring, "There is no article of my 
faith that would in any way inhibit-I think it encourages- the meeting of my oath of 
office.” Kennedy achieved his goals and defeated the well-known Nixon.
B. Televised Presidential Campaign Advertising Comes o f  Age.
It was during the 1964 presidential elections that campaign commercials actually 
came of age. Campaign strategists, analyzing the last twelve years of campaigning, 
found that the media can have an effect on a candidate’s image. The Nixon/Kennedy 
debates, for example, showed the power of appearance.42
Many changes occurred in presidential campaign advertising at this time. 
Campaign commercials were no longer just innocent experiments. Instead, they 
became aggressive and manipulative campaign tools. Both parties hired advertising
40
T. SORENSEN, KENNEDY 220 (1965).
41
BENNY, supra note 4 1  at 27.
According to Melvyn Bloom, author of Public Relations and the Presidency, people who had heard 
Nixon on the radio thought that he won. Those that saw him on television judged Kennedy the winner. This 
was attributed to Kennedy's better appearance.
agencies to handle their television advertising43 and committed large sums of money to 
advertising. The Democratic National Committee reportedly had a budget of around 
$4 million set aside for advertising, most of which was for television. Network 
television accounted for $1.7 million, with the remainder of the broadcast fund set 
aside for televised "spot" ads.44 The Republican National Committee allegedly had 
$4.8 million budgeted for advertising their national candidates, with all but around 
$200,000 set aside for national television.45
The role of the media advisor also changed during this time. Originally, media 
consultants were technicians who would purchase air time, check the lighting, supervise 
the makeup, arrange the set and time the speech.46 These people had very little voice 
in campaign strategy. President Johnson changed all that. Under Johnson, the role of 
the media advisor changed from that of a technical advisor, unwelcome at strategy 
sessions, to that of a campaign insider. Media consultants were now responsible for 
the strategy of the campaign’s advertising and often its communication strategy as 
well.47
43
The Deaoceats hired Doyle, Dene, Bernback, Inc. and the Republicans were represented by Erwin 
Hasey, Ruthrauff & Ryan, Inc. a subsidiary of -the Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc.
44
Rubin, supra note 18 at 185.
46
K. JAMIESON, PACKAGING THE PRESIDENCY 35 (1984).
14
These changes allowed "slicker," creative and more effective commercials to be 
produced.48 Johnson’s commercials, while considered "classics" in political advertising 
today, were considered very controversial in 1964. Johnson’s famous Daisy spot49, for 
example, depicted a little girl counting as she pulls petals off a daisy. Suddenly a 
man’s voice begins to count backwards from ten. As he reaches zero an atomic 
explosion fills the screen. While the mushroom cloud expands, Johnson’s voice says, 
"These are the stakes, to make a world in which all of God’s children can live, or to 
go into the darkness. We must either love each other or we must die." An 
announcer then urges voters to "vote for President Johnson on November third. The 
stakes are too high for you to stay home." Even though the Daisy spot never 
mentioned candidate Barry Goldwater’s name, Johnson’s media men were able to play 
upon the "bomb" paranoia of the 1950’s and early 60’s, and succeeded in portraying 
Goldwater as an irresponsible man ready to start atomic warfare. Johnson, in 
contrast, was presented as a man of peace.50
With the strong impact of this commercial, Republicans were naturally upset. 
Barry Goldwater said, "The homes of America are horrified and the intelligence of 
Americans is insulted by weird television advertising by which the Administration
The -themes of the 1964 election commercials were Issues of foreign policy, morality and peace for 
the Republicans, while the Democrats concentrated on taking the record of the Administration to the American 
people.
49
Aired September 7, 1964 during the NBC-TV Monday Might at the Movies showing of "David and
Bathsheba."
See Spero, supra note 1 for a detailed analysis of Johnson's advertising.
15
threatens the end of the world unless all-wise Lyndon is given the nation for his very 
own.”51
The "Daisy" spot was not an isolated incident. Other Johnson spots were also 
controversial. One such spot took advantage of a statement Goldwater had made 
earlier in the year when he said, "Sometimes I think this country would be better off 
if we could just saw off the Eastern seaboard and let it float out to sea." The 
Democrats used this statement in a spot showing a representation of the United States 
with a saw separating the Eastern seaboard while Goldwater’s comment is repeated.
This spot caused Dean Burch, the Republican National Chairman, to issue a statement 
criticizing the Democratic party for a campaign based upon "slanted, biased and 
fraudulent propaganda which is unparalleled in American political history."52
While the Democrats generally are remembered for their contribution to negative 
advertising during the 1964 elections, the Republicans were far from innocent. For 
example, one of Gold water’s themes was morality. In an attempt to bring this theme 
to the voting public, a half-hour paid documentary was presented on this subject. The 
purpose of this advertisement was to show how Johnson was allowing this country to 
morally decay.53 This film, which was titled "Choice," was sponsored by a front 
group called Mothers for a Moral America. It was designed to show the need for a
51
Rubin, supra note 13 at 136.
16
more moral America. To demonstrate this need, staged scenes of immorality were 
presented.54 This advertisment created tremendous controversy. National Broadcasting 
Company officials debated on whether this film could be broadcast without extensive 
editing55 and Barry Goldwater himself urged the party to withdraw the film and 
cancel bookings.56 Many observers at the time feared that the proliferation of "below- 
the-belt" advertising would open a Pandora’s box which could seriously demean 
democratic standards.57 While it was hoped that campaign advertisements would be 
reformed, there was serious doubt over whether they would be.58
In his second bid for the presidency and re-election, Nixon once again added to 
the development and sophistication of political television advertising.59 Nixon 
appeared to have learned from his mistakes in 1960 and found himself in much more 
comfortable waters during the late 1960’s and early 1970’s. The public was growing 
used to political advertising and Nixon was able to use his skill in this area to his 
advantage. Part of the responsibility for Nixon’s later advertising success belongs to
one scene shows a speeding Lincoln charging down the road with beer cans being -tossed out the 
window froa tine to tine. According to Rubin, this was "an obvious allusion to news reports of the previous
Easter that the President had been drinking beer while driving his car near the LBJ ranch." Other scenes showed 
violence and street looting; teenagers doing the "twist" with frenzy; shots of a young girl in a topless bathing
suit with young aen staring; a montage of pornographic magazines and the marquees of "adult" theaters.
55
Rubin, supra note 18 at 187:
59
See, J. MCGINNISS, THE SELLING OF THE PRESIDENCY 1968 (1969) and SPERO, supra note 1 for a close 
look at Nixon and his advertising strategies.
17
"The November Group," Nixon’s "in-house" advertising agency, which was completely 
independent of existing agencies and devoted only to the task of the election.
One of Nixon’s best commercials (1972) positioned Nixon as a diplomat who 
wants peace and not the cold warrior of the past. His "Tanya" spot used footage 
taken during his trip to the Soviet Union in May of 1972. In this spot, Nixon 
described visiting a Leningrad cemetery and tells of how, "Yesterday, I laid a wreath 
at the cemetery which commemorates the brave people who died during the siege of 
Leningrad . . . I saw the picture of a twelve-year-old girl . . . Her name was 
Tanya . . .  As we work for a more peaceful world let us think of Tanya and the 
other Tanyas . . . everywhere."
During his bids for election, Nixon was hit with some strong advertising from 
his opponents. In 1968, Hubert Humphrey used a classic commercial which posed on 
the screen the question: "Agnew for Vice-President?" The soundtrack of this spot 
consisted solely of a man’s laughter, which starts out in a mocking tone and grows 
increasingly out of control. At the end of the spot, a statement appears which says, 
"This would be funny if it weren’t so serious." In 1972, George McGovern hit 
Nixon with a 30 second commercial showing Nixon’s face replacing Washington’s on a 
shrinking one dollar bill. Neither of these commercials was able to hurt the popular 
Nixon.
When Nixon left office, America was in the midst of major problems. A 
bloody and unpopular war had ended, Watergate had revealed corruption at the top 
levels of government and the President was forced to resign in disgrace. Clearly,
18
there were major problems facing the presidential candidates in 1976. Television 
advertising was used to combat the credibility problem faced by government. During 
this period, political advertising matured to the level of a product commercial. In
fact, many of the spots at that time were so polished that they could almost be
mistaken for product commercials.60 Politicians were using advertising to its limit and 
did not mind being labeled "Madison Avenue."61
Both sides committed vast sums of money to television advertising.62 This 
advertising was used to address the domestic concerns on the minds of Americans.
The grass-roots Carter commercials showed Carter in work shirts with the sleeves 
rolled up, walking through peanut fields to the beat of a guitar. This spot used
"jump-cuts, pans to the faces in the crowd and cutaways to new shots of the
candidate.63 Carter’s "Executive" commercials showed candidate Carter on the
6 0
Spero suggests that Carter through his friendship with Coca—Cols chairman J . Paul Austin, was able 
to make use of Coke's advertising and marketing departments for his "Halls around Washington” commercial. 
Spero claims that this Is a typical Coke commercial with Carter Inserted in place of the product.
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There were limits though as to how "slick" a candidate himself could stand to be. Gerald Ford for 
example had one "slice of life” commercial made which showed two young women, who looked like they just walked 
out of a detergent ad, meeting in front of a Ford headquarters. The following dialogue took place:
First Homan: "Elliel Are you working for President Ford?”
Ellie: "Only about 26 hours a dayI”
First Woman: "When did this start?”
Ellie: "Well, let me ask you something. Notice anything about those food prices lately? . . . President Ford
has cut inflation in ha l f .”
First Woman: "In half? Howl"
These ads were pulled after two days when the White House called them "unpresidential."
62
D. CHAGALL, THE NEW KINGMAKERS 109 (1981). Each side spent $ 10 million for advertising- $ 7 
million of that on television. Commercials saturated 480 local television stations and 1800 radio outlets 
around the country, while a hundred different thirty- and sixty-second spots played on the three networks and 
their affiliates. Id.
campaign trail, speaking to an off-camera audience. In this spot he urges his 
audience to "Listen to me carefully. Watch television, listen to the radio. If you 
hear me tell a lie or make a misleading statement or avoid a controversial issue-if I 
ever do any of those things-don’t support me."64
Finally, in a five minute biography created by media consultant Gerald 
Rafshoon,65 the themes of home, family, mother and country were pushed. During 
these five minutes, the copy repeated the words "hard work," "family," "home," 
"land," and "love" a minimum of six times each.66 The images moved constantly in 
order to give the impression of action and variety.67 The whole point of this ad, 
according to Rafshoon, was to show Carter the man.
Through these commercials, Carter was addressing the American public’s 
concerns about political corruption and the current state of America. Carter was 
presenting himself as a new face, not one of the old power elite. He was telling 
voters that he could return to America the values that it was founded on.
Gerald Ford’s commercials stressed the themes of decency of and the progress 
that the country had made since Nixon’s resignation.68 John Deardourff and Doug 
Bailey, Ford’s media consultants, decided to let television and radio do most of the
Id. at no.
65
Rafshoon was immortalized by Gary Trudeau in the comic strip Poonabury. The word "Rafshoonery"
was used by Trudeau to depict image and symbol manipulation for the purpose of gaining votes.
66
CHAGALL, supra note 69 at H O .
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work and to keep Ford away from live encounters. This was done in order to avoid 
blunders.69
Because of a late start in advertising, Deardourff decided to use the advertising 
in a three-week blitz during the last part of the campaign.70 Several types of 
commercials were produced. One group consisted of a quintet of five minute 
documentaries.71 The second group consisted of 30 and 60 second spots showing 
Ford with old people, workers, women and children as well as "man on the street" 
interviews. Another group of ads were directed at regional concerns and were aimed 
at Mexicans in the Southwest, Cubans in Florida and Puerto Ricans in New York. In 
addition to these spots, a package of anti-Carter and pro-Ford commercials were also 
prepared. Even though both candidates were closely tied and both sides had a large 
arsenal of negative ads to draw on, none of the negative ads were used because both 
sides wanted to end the campaign on a positive note.72
C. Modern Uses.
I d . Ford bad put bis foot In bis mouth several times in tbe past, but possibly tbe worst blunder 
made was during tbe second presidential debate wben be told tbe audience tbat "there was no Soviet domination 
of Eastern Europe and under tbe Ford administration tbere will never be." When questioned on this statement, 
Ford hurt himself further by saying, "Tbe Yugoslavians don't consider themselves dominated by tbe soviet Union. 
Tbe people of Poland don't consider themselves dominated." To this, Carter replied, "I'd like to see Mr. Ford 
convince Polish—Americans and Hungarian-Americans in this country that those countries don't live under tbe 
domination of the Soviet Unionl" Id.
70
I d . at 111.
71
Id. The names of these mini-document arias were "The Ford Family," "A Ford Biography," "Tbe 
President's Accomplishments," "Ford as a Leader" and "Feeling Good," a montage of film and music aimed at 
ending the campaign on a high note. The theme of these spots was "he's making us proud again."
72
I d . at 119. Chagall states that in addition to wanting to end the campaign positively, both sides 
feared the backlash that could damage their position in an already tight race.
The presidential campaign of 1980 made some tremendous changes in the 
televised political commercial. Political advertising became known as political 
communication to media consultants. This is not just a fancy phrase, according to 
David Sawyer; "[w]hen we take on a candidate, we handle all media aspects of the 
campaign: print, radio, TV-the works."73
Many things changed in political communications since 1968, a time Sawyer 
labels the "dark ages of political communication."74 In addition to handling all phases 
of the campaign, media consultants also make more sophisticated use of polls. When 
used correctly, according to Sawyer, this allows for a two-way communication between 
the candidate and the voter.75 According to Sawyer, while polling has been around 
for a while, there had been a steady development of its techniques, especially the area 
of attitudinal studies-the ability to anticipate shifts in political attitudes.76 To 
demonstrate how this works, Sawyer compares Kennedy’s use of polls in 1960 to what 
could be done today. Polling in 1960 showed Kennedy had a Catholic problem. 
Today, polling would not only show the extent of the problem, but what kind of 
people make up this problem and why.77 This is important because certain trade-offs 
might be involved. For example, "one voter might be adamantly against a Catholic
22
candidate, while another might feel O.K. about him if there were a certain trade­
off involved- if the candidate took care of him in some other area.”78
There is also an increased use of focus groups, where preselected groups of 15- 
20 people selected on a psycho-demographic basis are put together in a room to 
discuss their opinions on a topic.79 This is another way that media consultants can 
pinpoint the concerns of the voters.
Media consultants often pre-test ads in focus groups. This allows campaign 
strategists to determine what the public’s reaction to an advertisement will be before 
they distribute it to the public at large. According to media consultant Robert 
Goodman, pre-testing with focus groups is not always reliable,"but they can sometimes 
keep you from making a terrible mistake."80
These techniques were used by Ronald Reagan to address the anxieties of the
American public during his campaign for office. Reagan enlisted the aid of Peter
Dailey, the Los Angeles ad man who was one of the brains behind Nixon’s
devastating electoral- and popular-vote victory in 1972.
Dailey’s task involved convincing the undecideds that Reagan was an 
experienced administrator with solid accomplishments behind him.81 To do this
8 0
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Id. at 215.
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Dailey ran a five minute documentary showing Reagan as an effective governor of 
California.82 Because America was in the midst of both domestic and foreign 
problems, Reagan used a series of "issue" spot commercials, which pushed his vision 
of the future - a strong and proud America. These spots were filmed in an "Oval 
Office" library setting with Reagan speaking quietly, persuasively, and effectively.83 
On inflation, Reagan proclaimed, "We do not have inflation because, as President 
Carter says, we lived too well. We have inflation in great measure because the 
federal government has lived too well."84 On the subject of unemployment, Reagan 
said, "We’ll beat the unemployment problem by allowing America’s economic system 
to do what it does best-produce. Expand, produce some more, expand some more, 
and at every step of the way create new jobs."85 One other spot called "Peace," 
which was designed to fight the "trigger-happy" image of Reagan that Rafshoon was 
exploiting, showed Reagan at the podium during the Republican convention. Reagan 
was shown saying, "Of all the objectives we seek, first and foremost is the 
establishment of lasting world peace." This was followed by a cut to Reagan sitting 
in an "Oval Office" setting. "Nancy and I have traveled this great land of ours many
82
Id. This docuaentary was given high saturation during a six week period. It: began with Reagan's
Screen Actor's Guild work in negotiating contracts and then shifted to his work as Governor of California. 
According to the narrator, "In 1966, he was elected governor of the state of California, next to the President,
the biggest job in the nation. What he inherited was a state in crisis. Working with volunteers, he got things 
back on track.” The visuals showed Reagan signing bills and shaking hands with judges.
83
Id. at 216.
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times over the years and we’ve found that Americans everywhere yearn for peace just 
as we do. It is impossible to capture in words the feelings we have about peace in 
the world, and how desperately we want it for our four children and our children’s 
children.”86
While Reagan proclaimed he wanted peace, he made it clear that he believed 
that peace could only come through strength. This theme was shown in a series of 
spots. One spot begins with newsreel scenes of the Soviet leadership reviewing 
Russian missiles in Red Square. Reagan portrayed himself as a man ready to meet 
the Soviet Challenge.
While the "slick” commercials of the past campaigns had been successful, it 
was very important that Reagan’s commercials did not seem "Hollywood." Thus, 
during Reagan’s campaign of 1980 the use of the "anti-commercial" was bom.
Dailey used "the old talking head" format to avoid any association of Reagan the 
candidate with Reagan the actor. There was a strategy behind this. According to 
Dailey, "the slightest hint of that kind of production would have been disastrous, 
invalidating everything we did. We simply showed a nice man who ran a very 
complex state very successfully. Every campaign is based on situation analysis.
Once you think you have a formula that applies to all situations, you’re in big 
trouble."87
The basic theme of all the Reagan commercials in 1980 was very similar to
87
Id. at 217.
25
Eisenhower’s "Time for a change" theme. Following every Reagan commercial were 
the words, "The time is now for Reagan, Reagan for President."88
For Carter in 1980, the first wave of television commercials centered on the 
themes of the complex domestic and foreign responsibilities of the Presidency and 
Carter’s interaction with ordinary citizens- in a suburban backyard, in an old folks’ 
home and at a building site.89 Rafshoon used five-minute film essays to describe the 
Presidential roles of Chief of State, Commander-in-Chief and Planner of the Nation’s 
Future. The tone was academic and reminiscent of old newsreels.90 These 
commercials were skillfully made and highly professional-even though they were not 
very effective politically.91
Phase two of the Republican advertising strategy occurred late in the campaign
I d . at 216.
89
I d . at 217.
90
I d . The "Commander-in Chief” ad, which was aimed at dispelling Carter's weakling image, showed 
Carter reviewing troops and inspecting missiles and aircraft carriers, while a narrator said,"When President 
Carter sits down at the White House with the Secretary of Defense, he brings a hard military professionalism 
to the meeting. This President is an Annapolis graduate. He spent eleven years in the Navy. And he knows 
what he's talking about. President Carter has always worked for a strong military, knowing the importance of 
being strong. The final shot showed Carter, Sadat and Begin signing their famous treaty, while the narrator 
concluded,” In the end. President Carter knows our final security lies not only with having a strong defense, 
but in being willing to sit down and negotiate for peace.”
The "Chief of State" ad, called "The President Alone," used fast cuts and swirling action in order to 
show Carter deeply involved in the frenzied activity of running the country. The narrator boasted of Carter's 
"hammering out an energy policy, deregulating air and trucking industries, organizing the Camp David talks, and 
reducing federal regulations and paperwork.” Id at 218. Then.as night approached. Carter was shown climbing 
a stairway at the White House and entering a study. "The responsibility at the White House never ends. Even 
at the end of a long working day there is usually another cable addressed to the Chief of State from the other 
side of the world where the sun is shining and something is happening." As the light in the study flashed on, 
the voice concluded,"And he's not finished yet.”
Id. at 218. Voters, according to the polls, did not doubt that Carter worked hard and kept long 
hours. They did however, question the effectiveness of his work. This was something that the ads never 
satisfactorily addressed.
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(Oct. 10) when Reagan’s camp released the first anti-Carter commercials. These spots 
compared the type of leadership that Carter had given during his term with what 
Reagan had to offer.
Now that the first series of commercials had given the public a chance to know 
Reagan,92 it was time to rally the troops, according to Dailey.93 Dailey said,"By the
last week we felt we had communicated as much as we could about Reagan, so we
launched an all-out attack on Carter, with more production values, more wheat-waving 
things."94 One thirty-second spot called "Flip-flop” dramatized the perception of 
inconsistency on Carter’s part. In this spot Carter’s campaign promises were compared 
to present realities. This commercial ridiculed Carter and damaged his credibility-his 
strongest trait.95 Perhaps the most devastating negative spot for Carter was one 
featuring Ted Kennedy at the podium urging: "If we want to get rid of inflation, if
we want to get rid of unemployment, if we want to get rid of high interest rates,
then we’ve got to get rid of Jimmy Carter!" The frame was then frozen and the 
words,"Vote for a new beginning, Reagan for President," appeared.
Carter’s final commercials were desperate last minute attempts to win back 
voters. They consisted of endorsements and a few negative commercials playing on
92
His lack of recognition bad dropped from 40 percent earlier in the campaign to 26 percent by October
93
Chagall, supra note 69 at 271.
95
Id. at 272. The visuals showed Carter's face grinning as the narrator quoted a campaign promise
and then cut to Carter grimacing as his actual performance was contrasted with it.
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the Reagan fears that had been dispelled by that time.96
Media consultant Tony Schwartz felt that Dailey’s work for Reagan was far 
more effective than that produced for Carter.97 According to Schwartz, "The best ads 
in this whole election are those from the Republican National Committee, showing a 
truck driver outside his truck and a guy in his TV repair shop saying they’ve always 
voted Democratic, but they’re going to vote Republican for a change. Those ads 
speak directly to what people feel in terms of the economy. They are so convincing 
that even though they’re done by actors, they come across as real."98
The elections of 1984 were relatively uneventful in terms of excitement and 
political advertising. The popular Reagan was running for re-election against the less 
popular Walter Mondale, himself reminiscent of the disastrous Carter presidency.
Reagan’s memorable ads in 1984 featured a metaphorical bear stalking the 
woods with a voice-over asking, "Isn’t it smart to be as strong as the bear."
Mondale used a series of negative ads reminicient of those used by Johnson in the 
1964 election. These ads tried once again to emphasize the "trigger-happy" image that 
Reagan successfully fought in 1980. One ad featured a flashing red phone with a 
voice over warning that once Reagan puts "killer weapons in space . . . computers 
will take control." This was reminiscent of Johnson’s famous Red Phone spot which 
asked, "You wouldn’t want it in inexperienced hands, would you?" Mondale later
Id. at 277. 
Id. at 246.
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scrapped his "Red Phone" spot for another spot reminiscent of Johnson’s "Daisy" 
commercial. This ad, which was set to the tune of Crosby, Stills, Nash & Young’s
"Teach Your Children," alternates scenes of nuclear missiles being launched with
images of children! While some of Mondale’s spots were tough and powerful, they 
could not shake the image of the "great communicator."
The 1988 campaign further refined the nature of political advertising.
According to Laurence Zuckerman, "If 1960 was the year that television became a 
decisive factor in a national campaign, 1988 is the year that television was the 
campaign."99 Both sides shielded its candidates from spontaneous contact with the 
press and instead relied upon advertising and carefully planned television appearances to 
shape the image of its candidates. Each image was geared around the issues that
were to be emphasized during the campaign. 100
The campaign started with the introductory or biography ads which stressed the
candidate’s ties to ‘the people’ and their upscale accomplishments. To accomplish this,
Mike Dukakis was portrayed as the son of Greek immigrants and George Bush’s war 
hero background was shown, complete with old newsreel footage of his being rescued 
after being shot down over the Pacific.
The second stage involved highlighting the issues. These "issue ads" usually do 
not get very specific.101 This is not so much a matter of the limitations of a 30
99
Zuckeraan, supra note 7 at 67.
100
The messages for 1988 were realism, toughness, and competence.
101
Diamond & Bates, 30-Second Elections 17 NEW YORK 46, 46-51 (1984).
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second format, but instead it is a campaign decision;102 a politician is less likely to 
get into trouble if he remains relatively ambiguous.103
Dukakis’ spots show a man of passion and moral leadership. His "Shelter" ad
showed images of the homeless, one within sight of the White House, while Dukakis 
says," I hope if I’m president and Mr. Gorbachev comes to visit me, that we’ll have 
a country in which there are not people sleeping on streets and in doorways."104 
Bush’s "The Future" spot portrayed the Vice-president’s granddaughter being swept into 
her grandfather’s arms, while Bush claims," I hear the quiet people others don’t: the
ones who raise the families, pay the ta x e s ............." The object in both of these
spots was to show a more caring face than that of Reagan.
The third stage of the media campaign is that of the ‘negative’ or ‘comparison’
advertising.105 The intended effect of these ads is to create a negative feeling toward 
the target of the message and a positive feeling toward the advertisement’s sponsor.106 
These advertisements usually begin when the race gets close. When the race tightened 
after the first presidential debate, negative ads began to surface. One such spot shows 
a strong-looking Bush next to a weak-looking Dukakis while the voice says," He
104
Diamond & Bates, supra note 11 at 36.
105
Id. at: 31.
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Garramone, Voter Responses to Negative Political Ads 28 J. OP BROADCASTING & THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA
250, 250 (1984).
allowed first-degree murderers to have weekend passes from prison."107 Dukakis 
countered this blow by putting out ‘capsule’ case studies dealing with the ‘middle-class 
squeeze’ issues- health care, tuition costs, and housing.108 One such case study 
showed a boy in Houston who was kept from participating in sports because his 
family had no medical coverage.
The fourth and final stage of the modern campaign occurs in the final days of 
the campaign. During this time the negative spots are pulled and replaced with more 
"upbeat" material.109 The purpose of this is to end the campaign on a positive note 
and to give the candidates one last opportunity to discuss their views on a subject.
II. The Law and Televised Presidential Advertising Content
After seeing how televised presidential campaign advertising has grown and 
developed over the last 40 years, it is important to examine the legal restrictions that 
presidential candidates and their consultants are under when determining the content of 
their commercials. The legal implications of televised presidential campaign advertising 
are both complex and interesting. This section will examine how the content of 
televised presidential campaign advertisements fit into the federal regulatory scheme of 
television advertising.
Federal law grants the area of presidential campaign advertising broad freedom.
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The Federal courts have consistently ruled that political speech is strongly protected by 
the First Amendment.110 This protection extends to the content of political broadcasts 
of legally qualified candidates for the Presidency of the United States.111 Because of 
this, there are very few legal restrictions on candidates for Federal office and their 
advertising.
Because the First Amendment112 applies to political campaigns, any restriction 
placed upon speech can be upheld only if it meets the most stringent standards.113 
These standards require a compelling state interest which operates without unnecessarily 
restricting free expression.114
The primary legal obligation placed upon the political candidate is that she
identify the persons who paid for or authorized the political advertisement.115 The
110
Colmat>la Broadcasting System v. FCC. 629 F.2d 1, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
111 Columbia Broadcasting System v. FCC. 453 U.S. 367, 377 (1981).
112
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "Congress shall make no law . .
. abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. . ..
113
Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360, 1367 (9th Cir. 1976).
114
Brown v . Hartlaqe. 456 U.S. 45, 52-54 (1981).
115
According to 2 USC » 441d (a)(1980):
Whenever any person makes an expenditure for the purpose of financing communications expressly advocating the 
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate, or solicits any contribution through any broadcasting 
station, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising facility, direct mailing, or any other type of general public 
political advertising, such comaunication-
1) if paid for and authorized by a candidate, an authorized political committee of a candidate, or its agents, 
shall clearly state that the communication has been paid for by such authorized political committee, or
(2) if paid for by other persons, but authorized by a candidate, an authorized political committee of a 
candidate, or its agent, shall clearly state that the communication is paid for by such other persons and 
authorized by such authorized political committee;
(3) if not authorized by a candidate, an authorized political committee of a candidate, or its agents, shall
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constitutionality of this type of statute has been upheld by the courts.116 While the 
sponsorship requirement is a restriction on political speech which is protected under the 
First Amendment, there is a compelling government interest in informing the electorate 
and allowing the electorate to make its own appraisal of the reasons why a particular 
candidate was being supported or opposed by an individual or groups.117
Extremely broad statutes requiring identification have been held unconstitutional. 
In Talley v. California.118 the United States Supreme Court invalidated a broad 
California statute forbidding the distribution of all anonymous circulars, stressing the 
chilling effect caused by the identification of those holding unpopular views. The 
court ruled that the extreme breadth of the statute made the law unconstitutional.
clearly state the name of the person who paid for the communication and state that the communication is not 
authorized by any candidate or the candidate's committee.
A candidate for purposes of this statute is defined as:
an individual who seeks nomination for election, or election, to Federal office, and for purposes of this 
paragraph, an individual shall be deemed to seek nomination for election, or election—
(A)if such individual has received contributions aggregating in excess of $5,000 or has made expenditures 
aggregating in excess of $5,000/ or
(B)if such individual has given his or her consent to another person to receive contributions or make 
expenditures on behalf of such individual and if such person has received such contributions aggregating in 
excess of $5,000 or has made such expenditures aggregating in excess of $5,000.
116
United States v. Scott, 195 F. Supp. 440, 443-444 (D.N.D. 1961).
117
Id. at 443.
362 U.S. 60 (1960).
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However, in United States v. Insco.119 a Federal District Court rejected the 
argument that the predecessor to 2 USC § 44Id120 was unconstitutional under Tallev. 
The court found that the federal statute was limited in its coverage to requiring 
fairness in federal elections and did not preclude anonymous criticism of oppressive 
practices and laws as referred to by the majority in Tally. Therefore the narrowness 
of the federal statute combined with the substantial government interest in providing 
voters with information on the source of political messages so that they can make 
informed judgments about the credibility of the messages makes the requirement of 
disclosure constitutional.
Aside from the requirements of sponsorship identification, the candidate is 
granted broad protection on the content of his televised political commercials.
In addition to being free from government censorship of the political 
advertisement, the candidate is also protected from censorship of his message by the 
licensed broadcaster.121
The constitutionality of preventing broadcast stations from censoring a candidate’s 
material was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in order to allow the full
365 F. Supp. 1308, 1312 ( D. Fla.1973).
120
18 USC § 612. This section required writings or other statements to contain the names of the 
persons responsible for the publication or distribution of the materials
121
47 USC § 315 (a)(1972) states:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a 
broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the 
use of such broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the
material broadcast under the provision of this section. Ho obligation is imposed upon any licensee to allow 
the use of its station by any such candidate.
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and unrestricted discussion of political issues by legally qualified candidates.122
A licensee also cannot censor advance copies of a candidate’s scripts. Candidates 
do not have to submit a script and the submission of a script cannot be used as a 
condition for the use of broadcast facilities if the purpose of the submission is 
censorship over content.123 Licensees can require scripts from candidates only for the 
purposes of aiding in the preparation of a program (i.e. time allocation, to determine 
if the appearance constitutes a use, to determine whether the paid broadcast carries the 
required sponsorship identification or to insure that the broadcast is the agreed upon 
length).124
In consideration for this freedom from censorship, the court has ruled that §
315 grants a licensee a federal immunity from liability for libelous statements that are 
made by the candidate.125
While there has never been any adjudication on this matter, there appears to be 
an exception to the rule that licensees cannot censor the material of candidates. It 
appears that broadcasters could refuse to broadcast obscene materials put forth by the 
candidate. This exception would be granted because the broadcast of obscene materials 
would require the broadcaster to violate sections of the criminal code in order to
122
Farmers Educational & Coop. Union v. WDAY Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 527-31 (1958).
123
Hilton Gross, FCC Fairness & Political Broadcast Branch, Remarks made during session of Broadcast
Education Association Meeting, April 12, 1980, Las Vegas, Nev.
125
Farmers at 535.
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comply with § 315.126
III. Related Studies and Research in Televised Political Advertising 
A.Imagery in Political Advertising
As mentioned in chapter one, there are two legitimate but categorically different 
ways of examining images in televised political advertising. One method involves 
examining image in terms of the internal characteristics of the candidate and the other 
involves examining externally controlled factors.
In recent years, researchers have examined some of the effects of imagery in 
televised political advertising on voters:
This research has shown that the purpose of television ads in political 
campaigns is that of image-builders, rather than vehicles of voter information. This 
means that a candidate’s professional qualifications in television advertising have been 
relegated to a position of secondary importance.127 Author Joe McGinniss states that 
on television, a candidate does not need ideas; it is "his personality viewers want to 
share."128 According to McGinniss, the style in political ads becomes the substance.129
126 FCC Staff Memo submitted by Chairman Fowler to Congressman Luken on January 19, 1984, Political 
Primer, lOO FCC 2d 1476,1513.
127
O'Keefe & Sheinkopf, The Voter Decides: Candidate Image or Campaign Issue? 18 J. OF BROADCASTING 
403, 410 (1974).
128
MCGINNISS, supra note 64 at 22.
129
Id. at 23.
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Similarly, Kaid and Davidson found that "when candidates use television to 
project themselves to voters, they engage primarily in a form of pseudointerpersonal 
communication in which television’s visual element and its capacity to induce intimacy 
is used to portray candidates as the candidates believe voters wish to see them."130
Research has also shown that paid spot advertising is an effective vehicle for 
image building by candidates. While there has been some conflict by researchers over 
this generalization,131 there is strong evidence which points to the fact that paid 
political spot advertising can have an impact on how voters see candidates and 
ultimately how they will vote. 132
130
KAID, NIMHO & SANDERS, supra note 3 at 185.
131
T.E. PATTERSON & R.D. MCCLURE, THE UNSEEING EYE/'lll (1976) Patterson and McClure have expressed 
skepticism over paid political spot advertising's effect on the candidate's Image. According to Patterson and 
McClure, "In presidential politics, advertising Image-making Is a wasted effort. All the careful Image 
planning-the coaching, the camera work, the calculated plea-counts for nothing." Patterson and McClure based 
this conclusion on their study of the 1972 presidential campaign. But S e e , KAID, NIMMO & SANDERS, supra note 
3 at 214. In later research, contributor Donald Cundy questions Patterson and McClure's conclusions about the 
role of political advertising on candidate image. According to Cundy, in Patterson's later study (T.E. 
PATTERSON, THE MASS MEDIA ELECTION (1980)) there is the prominence of image in the comments of the respondents 
and one can not help but wonder where they came from. Secondly, according to Cundy, the "unequivocal nature 
of the conclusions (including the distinction between presidential and lesser offices) appears to exceed the 
limitations of the data." Thirdly, it is implausible that political advertising is capable of exerting a 
significant impact on the vote, information levels, and general affective responses to the candidate, as 
suggested by Patterson and McClure's research, yet somehow it acquires massive impotence in the area of image. 
Finally Cundy states that the evidence from several other studies dealing specifically with the relationship 
between political advertising and image formation is inconsistent with Patterson and McClure's 1976 work.
132
Other researchers have found that paid political spot advertising has an effect on how the voter 
perceives the candidate. Hattenberg found a strong indication of a relationship between mass media advertising 
and candidate image. Wattenborg, From Parties to Candidates; Examining the Role of the Media 46 PUB. OPINION 
Q. 216 (1982) Keating and Latane found that the television appearance by a candidate can have a significant 
effect on a candidate's image. Keating & Latane, Politicians on TV: The Image is the Message 32 J. OF S O C . ISSUE 
116 (1976) Cundy found that paid political spot commercials can make a significant impact on voter images of 
political candidates. KAID, NIMMO & SANDERS, supra note 3 at 232 Kinder found that voters construct images of 
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Kelly and Mirer133 found that a voter’s choice is influenced primarily by their 
evaluation of the candidate. Other factors play a role only when the voter has no 
clear preference for any particular candidate.134 Markus suggests that candidate image 
has become one of, if not the most important element in a voter’s decision in the 
American electoral system.135
Diamond and Bates136 argue that many people mistakenly believe that image- 
making is easier than image-remaking and that challengers that were unknown have an 
advantage over familiar faces. Diamond and Bates in their study of research and 
actual campaign practices found otherwise. According to Diamond and Bates, "a well- 
planned, well-executed media campaign can shift voter perceptions of a candidate, even
& SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 859, 868 (1978) Meyer and Donohue found that the results of Preston's 1967 study applies to 
political advertising (Preston, Logic & Illoqic in the Advertising Process. 44 JOURNALISM Q. 231, 237 (1967), 
This study found that viewers attributed facts and information to ads that actually were not directly stated 
in the ads). Meyer and Donohue's study found that people tend to nisperceive the contents of paid political 
advertising and in the case of high-credibility candidates, they read in more positive information than is in 
the actual ad. This means that favorably predisposed voters are more careless in their interpretations of 
political ads for their favorite candidates and are more careful in listening to the ads for candidates that 
are not preferred. Therefore, a campaign ad writer could make vague and guarded statements without concern 
because the candidate's supporters will read in positive elements not specifically mentioned in the ads. Meyer 
& Donohue, Perceptions 6 Misperceptions of Political Advertising. 10 J . OF BUS. COMM. 29, 38(1973).
133
Kelly & Mirer, The Simple Act of Voting, 68 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 572 (1974).
134
Markus & Converse, A Dynamic Simultaneous Equation Model of Electorlal Choice. 73 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 1055 (1979) and Foti, Fraser & Lord, Effects of Leadership Labels & Prototypes on Perceptions of Political 
Leaders, 67 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 326 (1982).
135
Markus, Political Attitudes During An Election Year; A Report on the 1980 NES Panel Study. 76 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 538 (1982).
136
DIAMOND & BATES, supra note 88 at 262.
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a highly visible incumbent.”137
Even though evidence points to the fact that voters’ perceptions of candidates 
play an important role in election outcomes, there has been little research directed to 
discovering why candidates are perceived in certain ways. The majority of the 
research that has been conducted in the area of imagery and political advertising has 
dealt with the non-verbal character attributes of candidates. These studies suggest that 
the personal qualities of candidates play a key role in candidate perception and this 
consideration has a major impact on voters’ preferences.138
Several studies have shown that the public is looking for certain definable 
characteristics in political candidates.139 One study in particular found that the public 
is looking for a candidate that is extremely competent, extremely high in character, 
quite composed and sociable, slightly extroverted and slightly similar to voters in 
attitudes and beliefs. This study also found that the voter’s ideal candidate would be
137
Id. These authors give -the exaaple of the resaking of Chicago nayor Jane Byrne. Byrne entered 
the campaign with many image problems; she was seen as "vindictive, erratic, impatient, someone who does not 
keep her promises and who is not concerned about me.” Advertising was used to soften her image so that she 
always appears to be "listening to people, understanding their concerns and responding with appropriate 
actions." Visible symbols were used to re-enforce this message. The mayor was seen in advertisements as a 
hard worker, listening and talking to citizens in their own neighborhoods. Her day-to-day conduct was made 
to conform with this message. She could no longer "mix-it—up" with the press and she had to pay more attention 
to black concerns. The end result was that Byrne was successful in her re-election bid. Id.
138
See,Rosenberg, Bohan, McCafferty & Harris, The Image and the Vote: The Effect of Candidate
Presentation on Voter Preference, 30 AM. J. OF POL. SCI. 108 (1986) (This study examined the nonverbal, aspects 
of candidate's presentation on voter's perceptions and preferences and found that non-verbal aspects of 
candidates do influence voter's perceptions of candidates and this can significantly affect the viewer's voting 
choice).
139
Douglas, The Verbal Image: Student Perceptions of Political Figures, 39 SPEECH MONOGRAPHS, 1 0 , l 
(1972); Philport & Balon, Candidate Image in a Broadcast Debate, 19 J. of Broadcasting 184 (1975); D. NIMMO & 
R. SAVAGE, CANDIDATES & THEIR IMAGES 60-61 (1976)
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neutral in similarity in terms of background and personality.140
With appropriate pretesting and control over a candidate’s public appearances, a 
consultant could significantly manipulate the image presented to voters141 and this could 
effect the outcome of a political campaign.142
When the political consultant constructs an image for a candidate, it is very 
important that the advertising is compatible with what people find as the reality of the 
candidate himself. Diamond and Bates found that if the "mediated reality" presented 
by television advertising is contradicted by reality as a person actually experiences it, 
the "Ottinger Effect" occurs. The Ottinger Effect-the dissonance between the image of 
the candidate and the substance of the candidate-can destroy the image built by the 
candidate through his advertising.143
The majority of research on image manipulation in political campaigns has been 
conducted on the area of personal attributes of the candidate. There has been very 
little research performed on the use of external imagery which uses symbolism, editing 
and camera techniques as a means of influencing voters. The work that has been 
conducted in this area shows that imagery is widely used in presidential campaigns and
140
Hellweg, An Bxaaination of Voter Conceptual 1 z at ions of tha Ideal Poli.~ti.cal Candidate. 44 3. SPEECH 
COMM. J. 382 <1979)
141
Rosenberg, Bohan, McCafferty & Harris, supra note 156.
142
DIAMOND & BATES, supra note 88 at 44.
143
Id. at 368. The Ottinger Effect was naied after a congressman from New York's Westchester County 
who ran for the U.S. Senate In 1970. His advertising campaign, directed by media consultant David Garth, 
pictured a decisive, vigorous campaigner In shirt-sleeves, However, when Ottinger appeared In a live three- 
way debate with his opponents, he appeared to the TV audience as slow and unsure of himself. Ottinger lost. 
In part, because of the dissonance between the advertised ottinger and the real Ottinger. Id. at 247.
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suggests that these techniques may have some impact on elections.
Stuart Ewen, in his study of the use of image and style in contemporary 
culture,144 claims that image management has become a necessity in politics and that 
the powers of appearance have come to shape the way we comprehend matters of 
substance.145 While the use of image management in presidential elections can be 
traced back at least as far as the presidency of Andrew Jackson, in recent years 
political style has become the product of coordinated and carefully managed sales 
campaigns.146 Political campaigns have produced tokens147 to put their image before 
the public ever since presidential elections became mass participation events in the 
early nineteenth century.148 However, with the rapid increase in technology,149 the
144 S. EWEN, ALL CONSUMING IMAGES, (1988).
145
Id. at 259.
146 Id . at 266. The best representation of the power of Image making in politics comes from the career 
of Ronald Reagan. Reagan and bis presidency, according to Ewen, represented the unequivocal triumph of "image- 
making " in politics. Reagan was trained as a Hollywood actor and later served as a spokesperson for General 
Electric Corporation. Reagan's apprenticeship in Hollywood provided him with the opportunity to practice 
numerous images. According to Ewen:
At times we can close our eyes and hear the impassioned and honest tones of Spencer Tracy.
When an aura of simple trustworthiness is called for, he can draw upon his folksy Jimmy Stewart 
routine, replete with a shake of the head and an implied "Aw, gee." as the unyielding 
executioner of social programs, he becomes the "last angry man," true to his own inner sense 
of justice, painfully misunderstood. As the assassin of women's rights, he opts for the 
antiseptic mainstream; he and Nancy- become Ward and June Cleaver. As a militarist he assumes 
the pose of the indignant good guy, out to right the world's wrongs. In defining America's 
enemies, world struggles for power are couched in the familiar idiom of Star Wars, or some 
medieval costume drama. We are implored to join a heroic crusade against the dread "Evil 
Empire," or to throw in our lot with the "freedom fighters" south of the border. The plots 
are all familiar, tried and true. The Hollywood narrative supplies a stylistic model for 
political consciousness. Id. at 268—269.
147
For example, badges, flags and posters.
Davies, The Drama of the Campaign; Theatre, Production & Style in American Elections. 39 
PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 98, 98 (1986).
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use and sophistication of images in political campaigns have increased.150 Today, 
televised political ads151 are used as one of the primary methods of shaping a 
politician’s image with the American public.152
Images and emotional appeals are used in televised political advertising because 
they work well with the television medium.153 Producers of television’s content must 
use the larger, grosser human emotions154 in the content of the programming because 
these emotions are easier to convey with television’s technical limitations. These 
emotions do not require a great amount of detail to express and have a more powerful 
impact than ideas that are more subtle.155
Image oriented political advertising typically features a soft focus and warm 
colors in order to transmit a caring message. Similarly, these ads use inspirational 
music and pictures associating the candidate with the flag or other national symbols in
149
Particularly In the form of radio and television.
150
Davies, supra note 170 at 98.
151
Which are based almost entirely on the results of polling and stress only those points that the 
pollsters tell the admen will evoke a response from the voters.
152 ♦
Davies, supra note 170 at 104.
153 J. HANDER, FOUR ARGUMENTS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF TELEVISION 270 (1978) According to Mander, the 
structure of the television medium itself predetermines the boundaries of its content. Id. at 261. One of 
the biases of television's structure is the limitation of the technology. Mander argues that some types of 
information can be conveyed through television and some can be conveyed only after it has been reshaped, 
redefined, packaged and made courser than before. Mander also argues that some information cannot be conveyed. 
Id . at 266. Because of these technical limitations and the fact that subtle ideas do not work well on 
television, the content of television must be adjusted to compensate for these limitations. Id. at 270.
154
Such as hate, nationalism, fear, jealousy and violence.
155
MANDER, supra note 175 at 270.
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order to create an appeal to patriotism.156 Cinema verite’ methods may also be used 
in scenes designed to emphasize a candidate’s direct involvement with constituents-even 
though the "constituents" in the ad may be actors.157
In addition to using broad emotional appeals in its content, political advertisers
also use technique as a replacement for the content.158 These techniques159 are
designed to hold our attention and manipulate our emotions. They occur at a rapid 
pace and change quickly so that the viewer will not become bored.160
As a result political dialogue is becoming an "emotional orgy."161 Paul Taylor
of the Washington Post states that while political campaigns should be the feast of
democracy, they are in reality junk food.162 Voters today live in a world in which 
image has emerged as the predominant expression of meaning.163 Citizens are 
encouraged to accept the autonomy of images and the implication that substance is 
unimportant and not worth pursuing. The impact of all this could be seen in the
159 Such as toons, cuts, fades, changes in size, camera angles, sound tricks etc.
160 MANDER, supra, note 170 at 302. According to Mander, during the average television program 8-10 
technical events occur per minute and during the average commercial, which must fight even harder to keep its 
audience's attention, 10-15 events occur during a 30 second spot. Id. at 304.
161
The Public Mind: Image & Reality in America (Public Broadcasting System Broadcast, produced by
WNET/New York, 1989).
163
EWEN, supra note 166 at 271.
1988 Presidential campaign in which the major issues addressed were prison furloughs 
and flags.164 These two topics were found through focus groups to be "hot button" 
issues which instantly caused people to react emotionally.165 By using these emotional 
issues, candidates were able to divert from real complex issues facing Americans and 
devote the discussion of issues to relatively isolated or insignificant matters.166
While the topics of flags and furloughs for prisoners were relatively unimportant 
issues at the presidential campaign level, they were perfect material for spot 
advertisements. These topics created symbols that were short, visual and emotional.167 
They suggested a lot, but told very little. Most importantly they presented messages 
by candidates that were nearly impossible to oppose.168 The end result of the 
widespread use of imagery and symbols in the televised spots of the 1988 campaign 
was that the public was diverted from the real issues facing America.169
164
The Public Kind: Iaaqe & Reali-ty in Aaerlca, supra, note 183.
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IV. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
The possible effects of external imagery upon our electoral system have led 
Congress to attempt to regulate this area. During the 98th Congress, an amendment 
to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 was proposed.170 This bill restricted 
paid televised political advertisements to a "talking head format."171 The bill 
contained the following provisions:172
I. PURPOSE
The purpose of this act is three-fold. First, this act seeks to insure access and 
equality to the political process by restricting spot advertising which has contributed 
greatly to the high cost of advertising. Secondly, this act seeks to increase the 
informed choice of voters by enhancing full, fair and rational debate on the issues.
The Act’s final purpose is to futher the purposes of the first amendment. According 
to the Act, advertisments which employ external imagery have served to frustrate the 
intent of the first amendment by obscuring, rather than providing full, fair and rational 
debate on the merits of the issues and the candidates. Also, these advertisements may 
have contributed to declining political involvement, weakened political parties and 
created negative public attitudes toward the political process itself. Finally, the
170
For the full text of the Act, see appendix one.
171
Under this bill, the background for the ad must be filmed, televised or taped at the same time and 
with the same camera as that filming, televising or taping the speaker. The background must also be the 
filming, taping or televising of an actual scene or an actual event at the time of the event and not a staged 
reproduction.
172
The full text of the bill is reproduced in the appendix.
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television medium’s unique characteristics173 make its messages virtually unanswerable 
and less susceptible to the usual constitutional remedy of more or more diversified 
speech.
II. REQUIREMENTS
In order to alleviate these problems, the amendment would require the speaker 
to use a "talking head" format.174 Secondly, the advertisement must identify the 
speaker and an identification of the candidate the speaker is authorized to speak for, if 
the speaker is an alternative speaker. The advertisement must also identify the person 
who paid for the advertisement.
The background of the advertisement must be filmed at the same time as the
speaker, with the same camera and it must depict an actual scene or event and not a
staged reproduction of an event.
The Act states that the advertisement may contain the identity of the candidate’s
party and the office he is seeking. It may also state whether the candidate is seeking
election or reelection, as well as solicitations for contributions. Finally, handbill, full
173
The act states that television is a unique mediua because of the limitations in points of access, 
the cost of such access, and the pervasiveness, its emotive content and effectiveness of its reach.
According to the act, "the advertisement may not contain any visual or auditory material other 
than the voice and image of the candidate or alternative speaker speaking into the camera for the duration of 
the advertisment and certain specified written material.
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text reproductions, closed caption technology and similar methods are permissible.
III. STANDING
Under the act, any person who believes a violation has occurred may file a 
complaint with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).
IV. REMEDIES
Under the Act, the FCC is authorized to seek a permanent or temporary
injunction or restraining order. If the FCC fails to do this within five days of
receiving a complaint, the private complaining party may file in federal district court, 
a civil action for relief if he can show that the person involved committed a violation 
of the act. Relief will be limited to a permanent or temporary injunction or 
restraining order.
V. SUMMARY
There are two legitimate but categorically different ways of examining image in
televised political advertising. One method involves examining image in terms of the
internal characteristics of the candidate and the other involves examining externally 
controlled factors.
Researchers have examined the effects of image in televised presidential 
campaign advertising. They have found that televised presidential campaign advertising 
primarily serves as an image-builder for candidates. Research has shown that political 
consultants could manipulate the non-verbal image of the candidate and that this
47
manipulation could have an effect on voting behaviors. The manipulated image which 
is presented to voters, however, must match how voters see the reality of the 
candidate.
Very little research has been conducted on the effects of external imagery in 
televised political advertising. The studies that have been conducted have found that 
this form of imagery is in wide use in presidential campaigns and suggest that it may 
have some effect on viewers.
Because of the controversial nature of external imagery in televised political 
advertisements, Congress has introduced legislation restricting the advertisements to 
"talking head" spots. This legislation has not been passed into law as of this time.
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY
I. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
The controversy surrounding external imagery may lead Congress to reintroduce 
the legislation which would limit televised political ads to "talking head" spots.
Because any law which restricts an element of televised political advertising is bound 
to be challenged on constitutional grounds, a study which examines the constitutionality 
of this legislation would benefit Congress.
The purpose of this thesis is to determine whether a Congressional statute which 
would limit televised political advertisments for federal offices to a "talking head" 
format would violate the first amendment to the United States Constitution.
II. METHODOLOGY
There are four theories upon which the statute could be said to violate the first 
amendment. It may be argued that the statute is an invalid time, place and manner 
restriction, an invalid content based restriction, that the statute is overbroad or that the 
statute is unconstitutionally vague.
Because of the legal nature of this research question, traditional legal research 
will be used.
Traditional legal research in the area of Constitutional law consists of:
1) Developing a research problem.
2) Researching the general background of a problem through secondary sources.
3) Developing a list of cases which relate to the problem.
49
4) Reading and analyzing these cases in order to trace how the law has treated this 
area.
5) Shepardizing these cases to insure that they are still valid law.
6) Analyzing the results and drawing conclusions.
After examining the federal courts response to restrictions on political 
advertising, each of the four arguments against the statute will be examined and 
conclusions will be drawn as to whether this statute violates the first amendment.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DISCUSSION
There are four first amendment theories which apply to this statute. It may be 
argued that the statute is not a valid time, place and manner restiction. Secondly, it 
might be argued that the statute is not a valid content-based restriction. Third, the 
statute may be attacked as being "void for vagueness." Finally, the statute may be 
overbroad. After examining how the courts have interpreted the protections on 
political advertising, these four arguments will be examined.
I. THE COURTS AND RESTRICTIONS ON POLITICAL ADVERTISING
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In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights.175 a candidate for political office brought 
an action against a city because of its refusal to accept his political advertisements for 
use on the city’s rapid transit vehicles. The United States Supreme Court held that 
the advertising space on the city transit system was not a public forum and that the 
refusal to accept the political advertisement did not violate the first amendment.
The Court held that the nature of the forum and the conflicting interests 
involved are important in determining the degree of protection afforded to speech by 
the first amendment.176 According to the Court, because viewers of street car signs are 
a captive audience, who are present as a matter of necessity and not choice, the 
restriction advanced a substantial interest of the city.177
In United States S.W. Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v. United 
States.178 the plaintiff claimed that his first amendment rights were violated when 
officials from the Federal Aviation Administration refused to approve a political 
advertisement for display in various advertising areas of federally-owned airports. The 
Court of Appeals held that this refusal violated the first amendment. According to the 
Court, the advertising area was a public forum because it was not separated from the 
terminal itself. Because of the open nature of the airport terminal, there was no risk
175
418 D.S. 298 (1974).
176
Id. at 302.
177
I d . a t  3 0 4 .
178
708 F.2d 760 (1983).
of a captive audience being present as there was in Lehman.179
According to the Court, because this restriction did not restrict all display 
advertising, but only political advertising, it was content-based and not a valid time, 
place and manner restriction. It must therefore be analyzed under those criteria.
The Court reaffirmed the policy that content-based restrictions are presumed 
invalid unless a substantial or compelling state interest is involved. The court found 
that the restriction gave government significant control over the type of ideas to which 
the public would be exposed180 and that the regulation screened out non-controversial 
political messages as well as controversial ones.181 The regulation also demonstrates a 
governmental approval of paid commercial advertisements, but not political 
advertisements. This reverses the normal preference for noncommercial speech.182
The government’s interest in ensuring advertising revenue was not threatened by 
the controversial posters because less drastic methods of protecting this interest were 
available. Similarly, the use of disclaimers on the posters would avoid the appearance 
of governmental approval of controversial positions. The Court finally found that 
administrative complications alone did not justify the restriction.183 Therefore, in 
balancing the governmental interests, the court found that the interests were not
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compelling and therefore could not override the first amendment protection granted to 
the advertisements.
In City of Antioch v. Candidates' Outdoor Graphics Service.184 a city 
ordinance limiting the posting of political signs to a 60 day period before an election 
was challenged. The Court found that the ordinance was not a valid time, place and 
manner restriction because the ordinance did not determine whether and at what times 
the exercise of first amendment rights were compatible with the normal uses of a 
particular forum.185 The Court also found the ordinance to be an unconstitutional 
content-based restriction.186 There is a governmental interest in protecting the aesthetic 
appearance of a community because if uncontrolled, the community could be subject to 
visual blight and pollution.187 However, the ordinance in question did not adequately 
accommodate these goals in connection with the public’s right to be informed.188
Each medium has its advantages and problems.189 The use of the temporary 
political sign offers candidates certain advantages. It give them the opportunity to 
gain name recognition, target potential supporters and test the political waters before
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using more expensive mediums.190 While candidates may have alternative tools 
available, these alternatives are unsatisfactory because of they are more expensive and 
less effective. Because of the interest in allowing the candidates to use this important 
political campaign tool and the availability of less drastic alternatives to control the 
problems191 this ordinance did not meet the standard necessary to be a valid content- 
based restriction.192
In Lebron v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Authority.193 an artist whose political 
poster was denied display space in subway stations by a transit authority sued to 
compel the transit authority to display a poster critical of the Reagan Administration. 
The United States Court of Appeals held that the transit authority’s refusal to accept 
the poster for display in its subway stations because of its content violated the artist’s 
first amendment rights.
The court found that the restriction was not a valid time, place and manner 
restriction because the authority’s assessment of deceptiveness involved a judgment 
about the substance and content of the message. To justify the content-based 
restriction, the state argued that it was trying to advance the interest of preventing 
purposeful deception. The court found that the poster was not deceptive because a
191
Such as the regulation of size, design and construction of the posters, instituting clean up or 
removal requirements and prohibiting the posting of the signs where it would block or obscure vital signs or
utilities. Id. at 61.
193
749 P.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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reasonable person would see the poster as a biased portrayal of an idea. The poster, 
which was an obvious photo-montage, portrayed an implausible scene and contained a 
disclaimer. Because there was no pretense of objectivity, this poster could not be 
deceptive.194 The court stated that in balancing the various interests, the thumb should 
be on the speech side of the scale.195 When a message is significantly ambiguous to 
allow a discerning viewer to recognize it as something other than an actual event, then 
the courts should not restrict the speech.196 This, coupled with the fact that the courts 
wish to avoid deciding on the truth or falsity of political messages, led the court to 
hold that this was not a valid content-based restriction.197
In Penthouse Intern. Ltd. v. Koch.198 a magazine brought an action against 
subway authorities challenging the rejection of a poster featuring a caricature of a 
political figure portrayed as an almost nude male "stripper." The magazine claimed 
that the subway authorities violated their first amendment rights by refusing to display 
the advertisement on the grounds that its content was offensive.
The Court found the poster to be political speech. It held that often the 
distinction between commercial speech (which is subject to greater regulation) and
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political speech is not always clear-cut.199 Just because an advertisement is a paid 
commercial message does not deprive it of its political message and content.200 "If 
the message is integrally related to the exposition of thought which may shape our 
concepts of the whole universe of man, then it is political speech."201 The court also 
found the subway to be a public forum.202 Because the advertisement was political 
speech in a public forum, the state could not regulate the message without a narrowly 
drawn regulation which furthers a compelling state interest.203
The Court rejected the interests advanced by the state. It found that there was 
no captive audience present because the advertisements were displayed in an open area 
and not on the inside of the subway cars.204 The Court also rejected the argument 
that the posters were a public nuisance. A public nuisance according to the Court 
must be loud and intrusive and not passive.205 An advertisement is not a public 
nuisance just because it is in bad taste. In finding the subway authority’s rejection of 
the advertisement to be unconstitutional, the Court emphasized the importance of
199
I d . at 1344.
200
I d . at 1345.
201
I d . at 1344.
202
I d . at 1347.
203
Id . at 1349.
204
I d . at 1347.
205
Id. at 1350.
uninhibited, robust and wide-open debate on public issues."206
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II. TIME, PLACE AND MANNER RESTRICTIONS.
The first amendment does not give people a right to propagandize their views, 
whenever, however and wherever they please. 207 The proper test for a time, place 
and manner restriction depends upon the type of forum that the speech occurs in. 
Television is certainly not a public forum208 and therefore is not subject to the 
traditional time, place and manner test.209 Similarly, television is not a non-public 
forum210 and therefore subject to that standard of regulation.211
206
I d . at 1351.
207
Greer v . Spock. 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976); Adderlv v . Flordla. 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1967).
208
Television is not a public foruu. In Muir v. Ala. Educ. Television Comn'n, 668 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 
1982), the United States Court of Appeals beld that television is not a public forum for first amendment 
purposes because Congress did not create a right of access for viewers to television broadcast stations, id. 
at 1040.
209
The test for whether the regulation of speech is a constitutionally permissible time, place and 
manner restriction in a public forum is (l)whether the law is necessary to furthering a significant governmental 
interest Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98 (1972); (2) whether the restriction is content
neutral Hudgens v ■ NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976); (3) whether the restriction places no undue burden or
absolute prohibition on free speech. Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976); Heffron v. Intl. Soc'v for Krlsna Conscloiigniaa- 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981); Consol. 
Edison v. Public Serv. Comm/n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980); (4) whether there are ample alternative 
channels of communication for the information left open. id.
210
Public facilities which are not particularly linked to expression are referred to as "non-public 
forums.” S e e . Cornelius v. KAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985). Television, by
definition is linked to expression and it is especially linked to expression as a result of its access 
requirements to candidates during elections under section 315.
211
First amendment protection is granted little protection in non-public forums. The court will be 
quick to conclude that speech related conduct interfere with the facilities normal operations. Even a symbolic, 
rather than direct operational, interference will be enough to permit the government to ban the expressive 
activity. S e e . L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 988-89 (1988). In a non-public forum, the government may 
not only ban all expressive activity, it may also be selective about which speakers it will give access to and 
which subject matters it will permit to be discussed, so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light 
of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral. A speaker may be excluded from a non-public forum
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Television most likely fits into the category of semi-public forums212 and 
therefore must be analyzed under that test.
In Gravned v. City of Rockford.213 the United States Supreme Court ruled that
in order to determine whether a time, place and manner restriction in semi-public 
forums is reasonable, the nature of the forum must be considered in light of the type 
of speech activity that is being regulated.214 If the speech activity is found to be 
compatible with the place’s normal activity, then it must be determined what 
governmental interest is promoted by the regulation and whether it is legitimate.215
The initial inquiry under Gravned is whether the expressive activity being 
regulated is appropriate for the place used as a forum. Brown v. Louisiana216 
illustrates this prong of the Gravned analysis. In Brown, five black men were
convicted under a breach of the peace statute for standing silently in the reading room
of a segregated public library in protest of racial discrimination. The Supreme Court
if be wishes to address a topic not encompassed within tbe purpose of the forum or if he is not a member of the 
class of speakers for whose special benefit the forum was created. However, the government violates the first 
amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise 
includible subject. See, Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
2 12
Semi—public forums consist of facilities which were not created primarily for the purpose of 
furthering expression, but which nonetheless are closely linked to the interchange of ideas. Television was 
not created primarily for the purposes of furthering political ideas, but it is closely linked to the 
interchange of political ideas because of the requirements of sec. 315 of the Communications Act.
213
408 U.S. 104 (1972).
214
S ee, id. at 116.
216
383 U.S. 131 (1966).
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ruled that the statute unconstitutionally violated the men’s first amendment rights.217 
According to the Court: n [T]he circumstances here were such that no claim can be 
made that use of the library by others was disturbed by the demonstration. . . .
Were it otherwise, a factor not present in this case would have to be considered."218 
Through this statement, the Court implied that if the men had engaged in a loud 
disruptive protest their activities would not have been protected by the first 
amendment.
It may be argued that the broad protections given to political speech were 
enacted to provide the public with the information necessary for making rational voting 
choices. Those favoring restrictions may argue that television’s purpose is to operate 
in the public’s interest, convenience and necessity. Televised political ads should 
conform to these standards by providing information which would aid voters in making 
rational voting choices, not irrational ones. Critics may argue that external imagery in 
televised presidential campaign advertising is not quietly providing relevant information 
to voters on issues of concern, but instead substitutes flash, style and emotion for 
issue information.219 This makes external imagery incompatible with the purposes of 
television broadcasting and therefore it can be constitutionally regulated.
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The courts are not likely to accept this argument. The Court in Antioch said 
that each medium has its special advantages and problems.220 Television is a visual 
medium which relies on strong visual messages to gain viewer interest.221 While the 
emphasis on visual information may create viewer interest, it can also mean that the 
information presented is not always "hard facts." This does not follow that 
information is not being presented, it merely means that the information presented may 
not be the most useful information.
The use of extmal imagery can be differentiated ffom cases such as Brown, in 
which the method of communication was clearly inconsistent with what a person would 
expect in that surrounding. With television, viewers expect strong emphasis on visuals 
and softer information. External imagery in television does not upset their 
expectations, because it is not inconsistent with what they would expect in that forum.
Because the speech activity is compatible with television’s normal activity, it 
must be determined whether a legitimate government interest is being promoted by the 
regulation.222
The governmental interests involved here do not appear to be legitimate because 
regulations are not content-neutral. In Africa/Namibia, the Court found that the 
regulation was not content-neutral because it did not restrict all display advertising,
2 2 0
557 F. Supp. at 58.
22 1
See HANDER, supra note 171.
222
408 U.S. at 116.
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only political advertising. 223 In the same manner, the regulation of external imagery 
does not apply to all advertising, only political advertising. In Lebron, the Court 
found that because the government was making value judgments about the substance 
and content of the message through its restriction, it was not content-neutral.224 By 
regulating external imagery, the government is making a value judgment about the 
quality of its substance. It is essentially labeling external imagery as bad information. 
For the same reasons that the regulations were found not to be content neutral in 
Africa/Namibia and Lebron. the court will likely find that the regulation of external 
imagery in televised presidential campaign advertising is also not content neutral. 
Therefore, the regulation would not be a valid time, place and manner restriction.
III. CONTENT-BASED RESTRICTIONS
Because regulating external imagery in televised presidential campaign advertising 
would not be a valid time, place and manner restriction, it must be determined 
whether the regulation would be a valid content-based restriction. Because the activity 
involves protected political speech225 and occurs in a semi-public forum,226 the first
223
708 F.2d at 768.
224
749 F.2d at 899.
225
External Imagery is constitutionally protected under the area of "speech-plus." Speech-plus occurs 
when the physical action element of expression combines with the speech element to become an important method 
of communicating an idea. Kuclnlch v. Forbes. 422 F. Supp. 1101,1111 (E.D. Ohio 1977). As discussed earlier, 
in televised presidential campaign advertising, there is a strong emphasis on the visual conduct. The visual 
conduct of the ad serves to re-enforces the verbal portion by adding an emotional emphasis to the spoken 
message.I d .
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amendment rights of the communicator must be balanced against the state’s interest in 
regulating the speech.
In order to defeat a candidate’s right to express himself through external 
imagery in televised presidential campaign advertising, there must be a compelling 
government interest involved.227
The few cases in which the federal courts have ruled on issues related to 
political advertising demonstrate some trends which may be helpful in predicting how 
the courts will balance the competing interests when determining the constitutionality of 
regulations on external imagery.
The courts seem to adhere to a strong libertarian standard when ruling on 
political advertising issues. The courts emphasize the importance of wide-open debate 
on political elections and preserving the "free marketplace of ideas." The libertarian 
standard is followed through the presumption of the invalidity of governmental 
regulation of political advertising and the attempt to keep government from having too 
much control over the type of ideas to which the public will be exposed. The 
libertarian stance of the court in political advertising issues can also be seen in the 
"hands off" attitude by the court in deciding the truth or falsity of political messages.
Television is not generally a public forum. In Muir v. Ala. Educ. Television C o M ' n .6as F.2d. 
1033 < 5th Cir. 1982). tbe United States Court of Appeals ruled that because Congress did not create a right 
of access for viewers to television broadcast stations, television is generally not a public forum for first 
amendment purposes. id. at 1040. As discussed earlier, television best fits within the designation of a semi­
public forum.
227
See, O'Brien. 391 U.S. at 377.
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The courts also recognize the importance of the various campaign tools available 
to the candidate and exhibit a policy of allowing the political candidate full use of 
these tools to communicate their message. The courts permit the use of these tools 
even though the use may infringe on certain governmental interests.
The universal exception to this "hands off" attitude appears when a captive 
audience is involved. The courts recognize the right of a person to be free from 
messages that they cannot avoid and will allow restrictions on political advertising on 
this basis.
Based on these trends, the following conclusions may be drawn regarding the 
balancing of the competing interests involved in external imagery in televised 
presidential campaign advertising:
A.Rationality in Elections
A central premise of democratic theory is that electoral outcomes should be 
rational rather than irrational. In other words, election outcomes should reflect the 
true, reasoned and informed choice of the people.228 Our system of government was 
designed to allow citizens to choose leaders that will guide the nation toward the 
attainment of societal benefits229 and allow citizens in elections to select the best
228
Se e , a.q.. C. BECKER, MODERN DEMOCRACY 14 (1941) (an assumption of the theory of democratic
government is that "its citizens are rational creatures"); THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 3S1 (J. Madison) (B.
Wright ed. 1961) ("[I)t is the reason, alone, of the public that ought to control and regulate the government. 
The passions ought to be controlled and regulated by the government.").
229
See THE FEDERALIST No. lO at 134 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961) (the best leaders will be citizens 
"whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country" and who will be "least likely to sacrifice 
it to temporary or partial considerations").
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leaders from among the available candidates.230 This function is fulfilled only when 
electoral outcomes are rational. Irrational voting raises the possibility of electing
candidates who are, at best, less capable than other contenders, or at worst,
incompetent, unscrupulous or corrupt. Because of this, irrational electoral outcomes 
resulting from irrational voting threaten the proper functioning and, ultimately, the 
survival of the democratic state.231
As demonstrated, studies suggest that external imagery in televised presidential 
campaign advertising damages a rational democratic process. In order for a rational 
democracy to work, the voter must collect information on which to base his 
decision.232 This information collection depends on accurate, relevant information on 
the candidate’s positions on the issues faced by the nation233 being available to the
230
Frequent, elections were eeant -to ensure that -the people continuously reassess the quality of their 
government, see THE FEDERALIST No. 52, (J. Madison) and the opportunity to reelect an incumbent allows the
electorate "to prolonq the utility of his talents and virtues.” TBE FEDERALIST Mo. 72 (A. Hamilton); cf. THE
FEDERALIST No. 64, at 421 (J. Jay) (B. Wright ed. 1961) (although there was some disagreement at the
Constitutional Convention of 1787, the Framers generally believed that elected bodies would be "composed of 
the most enlightened and respectable citizens"); THE FEDERALIST No. 68, at 442 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed.)(the 
electoral system devised to elect the President "affords a moral certainty, that the office of President will 
never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualif ications.") .
231
THE FEDERALIST No. 6, at 109 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961)([Some causes of war] take their 
origins entirely in private passions; in the attachments, enmities, interests, hopes and fears of leading 
individuals in the communities of which they are members. Men of this class, whether the favorites of a king 
or of a people. . . have not scrupled to sacrifice the national tranquility to personal advantage or personal
gratif ication.
232
See, A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER & D. STOKES, THE AMERICAN VOTER 169-170 (1960).
233
See, id. at 216—65. The key to rational voting lies more in the reasoning processes than in the 
consideration or lack of any particular issues. Characteristics normally thought to be unrelated to a 
candidate's qualifications-e.g. race, see Anderson v . Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964)(state may not print
candidate's race on ballot because to do so would improperly put state imprimatur on racially-based voting)- 
may under certain circumstances, form the basis for a rational vote. For example, a voter may be acting 
rationally when he votes solely on the basis of race where the voter believes that minority representation in 
elected bodies must be increased or that black candidates will do more to advance the interests of black
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voters.234
It may be argued that external imagery dilutes the informational value of the 
spots.235 If members of a democracy are to successfully govern themselves, they 
must have easy access to a reasonably accurate and complete account of the facts 
needed to make informed decisions on the candidates. Studies indicate that very little 
rational information is being presented in today's advertisements.236
Candidates rarely use advertising to take a specific position on an issue.237 
While candidates are capable of taking a stand in 30 seconds,238 most choose not to 
for strategic reasons.239 Taking a specific stand alienates a share of the audience and 
when trying to win a campaign, a candidate does not want to do anything which will 
separate him from potential supporters.240 Instead an "emotional orgy" takes place
citizens than will white candidates. Such a vote is really an issue—based vote, since the issues of concern 
to the voter involve race and the voter is simply using the candidate's race as a shorthand for calculating 
the responsiveness of the candidate to those issues. A vote based on race is irrational when there is no 
reasoned connection between race and the electoral issues of concern to the voter.
234
An "issue voter who is proceeding on misinformation cannot be counted as 'rational'" insofar as 
his vote does not express "what the voter intended and [is] thus subversive of meaningful dialogue." Converse, 
Public Opinion and Voting Behavior, in 4 HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 75, 121 (F. Greenstein & N. Polsby eds. 
1975).
235
See, The Piihilc Mind, supra note 179.
237
DIAMOND & BATES, supra note 88 at 357.
238
It is possible for a candidate to take a very clear stand in 30 seconds. For example, Eisenhower's 
promise to go to Korea took less than 30 seconds and so did McGovern's promise to end the Vietnam War.
239
D I A M O N D  & BATES, supra note 88 at 357.
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using external imagery,241 in which voters are not being informed, but manipulated.242
The use of external imagery in televised presidential campaign advertising to 
misrepresent facts and deceive the public is also causing great concern.243 Today’s 
communication consultants are experts in the use of half-truths and outright lies.244 
The misrepresentation and exaggeration is best illustrated through negative advertising. 
Negative advertising often uses the record of the candidate to convey a misleading 
impression by omitting important elements of context by selectively quoting from the 
candidate’s articles and speeches or using distorted statistics that purport to "say it 
all," but which in reality say nothing.245
This lack of rational information is causing presidential elections to become 
more irrational in nature246 causing some to fear that an incompetent, unscrupulous or 
corrupt candidate with a good television persona could be put into a powerful 
position. 247 Arguably, a candidate that is well-known and experienced in front of a 
camera can portray himself as competent and knowledgeable, even if he is not.248
241
The Public Mind, supra note 179.
242
See, Id.
243
See generally. Winsbro, supra note 34.
244
See generally, Wlnsbro, supra note 34.
245
see, D. HUFF, HOW TO LIE WITH STATISTICS (1956).
246
The Public Mind, supra note 179.
247
See. Rosenberg, Bohan, McCafferty & Harris, supra note 156; SPERO, supra note 1.
248
S ee g e n e r a l l y , Rosenberg, Bohan, H c C afferty & Harris, supra note 156.
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It is unlikely however that the courts will find this to be a substantial 
government interest which would allow government to step in and regulate content.
The courts, through their decisions on political advertising, have reaffirmed their 
devotion to the free marketplace of ideas concept. This means that ideas and content, 
both good and bad, should be allowed to compete without governmental interference. 
There are three reasons why this result is likely. Televised political advertising is 
only one method of obtaining information on candidates. Voters may look to the 
press, to the candidate’s own "paper trail" or even to the opposition to provide 
additional information on a candidate. Placing restrictions upon the use of external 
imagery in televised presidential campaign advertising is therefore not the least drastic 
means of combating some of the problems present in today’s elections.
The courts also allow for the full use of political tools. It is likely that the 
court will allow a liberal use of television advertising in the same way that they 
allowed the political signs in Antioch. This would be consistent with the preference 
the courts have for the uninhibited campaign communication over other governmental 
interests.
The paucity of research on external imagery may also cause the court to avoid 
placing restrictions on external imagery. While the available research suggests that 
external imagery has a negative effect on our elections, there is no solid evidence of 
this. For these reasons, the courts will likely find that the rationality of elections is 
not a significant interest which would justify restrictions on an aspect of political 
advertising.
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B.The Expense o f  Television Advertising.
External imagery in televised presidential campaign advertising has driven up the 
cost of Presidential campaigns.249 While broadcast advertising in general is expensive, 
the use of external imagery with its sophisticated techniques have added to this high 
cost.250 While exact figures are difficult to determine,251 the cost of running for office 
has increased dramatically over the past 35 years and much of this increase can be 
attributed to the cost of television advertising.252
While there are legislative limits on the total amount that candidates may spend 
on an election,253 the laws permit candidates to allocate the money in any way they 
choose.254 Increasingly, most of the budget is being set aside for television 
advertising.255
249
Diamond & Bates, supra note 11 at 32.
251
The Federal Election Commission depends on the figures reported by the candidates. The accuracy 
of these figures are difficult to determine.
252
According to Diamond and Bates:
From 1912 to 1952, each national partly spent: about 'the same amount of money per vote cast In 
the national elections. Then, with the Introduction of television, campaign expenditures 
skyrocketed. By 1968, the Republican and Democratic committees were spending three times as 
much per vote as they had sixteen years earlier. Moreover, the share of spending going to 
television has Increased at an even faster rate and at the expense of other campaign methods.
Total political spending (adjusted for Inflation) has tripled since 1952 while the amount spent 
on TV has Increased at least fivefold. Diamond & Bates, supra note 11 at 32.
253
Specifically the Federal Election Campaign Act.
254
A. SALDICH, ELECTRONIC DEMOCRACY: TELEVISION'S IMPACT ON THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS 41 (1979).
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When the cost of communication drives up the price of campaigning, serious
damage can occur to the right to participate in the political process. Robert Kennedy,
former U.S. Attorney General and brother of President John F. Kennedy, said in a
study of campaign costs:
The mounting cost of elections is rapidly becoming intolerable for a 
democratic society, where the right to vote, and to be a candidate, is the 
ultimate political protection. We are in danger of creating a situation in 
which our candidates must be chosen only from among the rich, the 
famous, or those willing to be beholden to others who will pay the bills.
Heavy dependence on the relatively few who can meet these enormous 
costs is not only demeaning and degrading to the candidates, it engenders 
cynicism about the political process itself.256
Critics fear that the high cost of television will drive out the less wealthy or 
put them in hock to special interest groups.257 While the high cost of campaigning 
began before the introduction of television to the political scene,258 the introduction of 
television has sent costs soaring. As Theodore H. White remarked, "TV is no 
medium for a poor man."259
This high cost of campaigning has caused some critics to fear that candidates 
will go outside the law in order to pay for their campaigns.260 These fears were
R. GILBERT, TELEVISION & PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS 91-92 (1972). Campaign costs began bo rise
dramatically with the introduction of radio. During the 1932 election, expenditures for radio doubled over 
what they were for the 1928 election. By 1948, radio had such a high priority on campaigns that campaign 
leaders did everything they could to raise the substantial sums of money necessary to use radio. I d .
260
SALDICH, supra note 90 at 41.
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realized when it was revealed during the Watergate hearings that the Committee to 
Reelect the President had gathered a secret fortune, known as a "slush fund" for 
campaign expenses. This money was secretly provided by special interest groups that 
expected or were promised political favors in return.261
The expense of elections, due in part to the expense of advertising is unlikely 
to be found to be a compelling state interest. In Antioch, the court stated that each 
medium has its own advantages and problems. Like the political signs in Antioch, 
television advertising offers numerous advantages to the political candidate. Television 
advertising offers the candidate a low cost per thousand price and the ability to reach 
undecideds and non-supporters, rather than only those voters already in favor of a 
candidate.262 However, while television advertising does provide certain advantages, 
television advertising, like the signs in Antioch, has problems associated with it. 
Television is a very expensive medium and those who cannot afford it will be 
excluded.
Because alternative forms of campaigning are available, it is unlikely that the 
court will find a compelling state interest present. Restricting external imagery will 
not allow more people to use the medium. It will only limit the utility of the 
medium.
One example of the favors granted to these special Interest groups occurred when Nixon granted a 
one cent Increase In the price of milk Immediately after Nixon had announced a price freeze. That was his 
thank you to the milk Industry for the $2 million that they had contributed to his reelectlon campaign. Using 
the Department of Agriculture's estimated milk consumption In 1977, Saldlch found that this Increase would bring 
In about $400,000 every year; a good annual return on a one-time campaign Investment. I d .
262
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C.Privacy and Captive Audience Concerns
Another interest which could be furthered by the regulation of external imagery
involves the area of privacy. The first amendment generally recognizes that a person
has the right to be left alone263 and no one has the right to press even good ideas on 
an unwilling recipient.264 A person’s home is afforded special protection under this 
right of privacy265 and under the appropriate circumstances the communicator’s first 
amendment rights may bow to privacy interests. 266 In Kovacs v. Cooper.267 for 
example, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the first amendment rights of the 
operator of a sound truck on a public street would have to yield to the privacy rights 
of the bordering homes who were unwillingly being subjected to the messages from 
the sound truck.
It may be argued that the external imagery is forcing its way directly into 
viewers’ homes through their television sets. It can be argued that a person’s home
is not an open, public place and that dwellers have no choice but to have the
advertising message "thrust upon them by all the arts and devices that skill can
263 Rowan v. Unit.ad States Post. Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970).
264
I d . at 738.
265
Id. The Supreme Court has ruled that the ancient concept that a man's home Is his castle into which 
not. even the king may enter has not lost Its vitality In today's society.
266
See, e.g., Rowen, 397 U.S. at 736 (right to be let alone balanced against the right to communicate).
267
336 U.S. 77 (1949).
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produce.”268 In Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic Nat’l. Comm..269 the
United States Supreme Court recognized the captive nature of the broadcast audience.
According to the Court:
[Broadcast] listeners do not have the same option that the reader of 
publications has-to ignore advertising in which he is not interested-and he 
may resent its invasion of his set. As the broadcast media became more 
pervasive in our society, the problem has become more acute. . . .
Written messages are not communicated unless they are read and reading 
requires an affirmative act. Broadcast messages are "in the air." In an 
age of omnipresent radio, there scarcely breathes a citizen who does not 
know some part of a leading cigarette jingle by heart. Similarly an 
ordinary habitual television watcher can avoid these commercials only by 
leaving the room, changing the channel or doing some other such 
affirmative act. It is difficult to calculate the subliminal impact of this 
pervasive propaganda which may be heard even if not listened to, but it 
may reasonably be thought greater than the impact of the written word.270
Finally, while the concerns over privacy and viewers being a captive audience 
may seem like a valid argument for a substantial government interest, it is likely that 
the courts will reject this argument also. A person viewing televised presidential 
campaign advertising at home is not a member of a captive audience as would be a 
person on a streetcar. In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights.271 the Supreme Court 
reversed its earlier concerns about the captive audience effect of broadcast advertising. 
In Lehman, the Court differentiated political advertising on buses from broadcast
268
Lehman, 418 U.S. at 302.
269
412 U.S. 94 (1973).
270
I d . at 128.
271
Id. at 299.
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advertising entering homes. According to the majority opinion and the concurring 
opinion by Justice Douglas, one who tunes in on an offensive program at home can 
either turn it off or tune in another station if he wishes. 272 He can avoid the 
message entirely without exerting great effort. A televised political advertisement does 
not have the intrusive effect necessary to circumvent first amendment protection. 
Therefore, it is likely that the courts will find that there is no captive audience 
present.
Therefore, based on first amendment theory, public policy considerations and 
court opinions examining political advertising, the courts may find that because of the 
strong protections placed upon political speech, the availability of alternative means of 
obtaining political information and. the lack of research into the effects of external 
imagery, the court will likely find that a compelling state interest in regulating external 
imagery does not exist. Therefore, a content-based restriction upon external imagery 
in televised presidential campaign advertising would not be constitutional.
IV. OVERBREADTH
A statute is overbroad if in addition to proscribing activities which may 
constitutionally be forbidden, it also sweeps within its coverage, speech or conduct 
which is protected by the guarantees of free speech.273
In recent years, the use of overbreadth analysis in first amendment cases has
272
Id. at 302, 307.
273
see. Thornhill v. Ala., 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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been significantly curtailed. In Broadrick v. Oklahoma.274 the United States Supreme 
Court held that the overbreadth must be substantial compared with the legitimate 
applications of the statute.275 In Broadrick. the court distinguished between statutes 
primarily regulating conduct and those directly governing speech. 276 In situations where 
a statute regulates pure speech, standard overbreadth analysis applied. 277 However, in 
cases in which a statute governs conduct, which happens to contain expressive 
content, the "strong medicine" of complete invalidation of the statute should not be 
applied.278 Instead, for facial invalidation to be appropriate, the "overbreadth of the 
statute, must not only be real, but substantial, judged in relation to the statute’s 
plainly legitimate sweep."279 The court found that although a statute may be applied 
to a constitutionally protected expression, there was no substantial overbreadth when 
such potential applications of the statute were not numerous enough compared with the 
body of permissible applications.
Under this analysis, the overbreadth analysis would not apply to the statute at 
hand. First of all, as the preceding section demonstrated, it is unlikely that external 
imagery in televised political ads would lack protection under the first amendment.
274 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
278
Id. at 613.
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Because the statute restricts constitutionally protected expression, the overbreadth 
analysis is not appropriate.
Even if external imagery in paid televised political advertisements were found to 
be unprotected expression, the statute would not be overbroad. While it could be 
argued that in addition to proscribing external imagery (assuming it was constitutional), 
it also sweeps within its coverage protected speech by prohibiting political messages 
other than those relating to campaigns. For example, if the president sponsored a 
commercial advocating a "just say no to drugs," program, he may be restricted in his 
presentational methods by this statute. The advertisement involves an expenditure for 
the broadcast of a televised paid political advertisement. While it may have absolutely 
nothing to do with a campaign, it does advocate a certain political position (that drugs 
are a problem and must be eliminated). This is clearly a protected message, outside 
of the purposes of the statute, but it may be conceivably covered under the statute.
It may be argued that this statute would place strong restrictions on an important 
message and eliminate its effectiveness.
It is unlikely that this argument would prevail however. External image is not 
pure speech because it contains conduct elements through the use of imagery.
Therefore, there must be substantial overbreadth for the statute to be invalidated under 
this theory. The potential unconstitutional application of the statute is remote at best 
and is therefore not numerous compared to the body of permissible applications.
Nearly every conceivable application of this statute would involve the type of political 
advertising "spots" that have been the source of problems. In fact, the statute itself
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makes it very clear that the act applies exclusively to this type of advertising/80 
Therefore, this statute would not be found to be substantially overbroad.
V. VAGUENESS
A statute is void for vagueness if the conduct forbidden by the statute is so 
unclearly defined that persons "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its 
meaning and differ to its application."281
Theoretically, the prohibition on statutory vagueness is based on the Due 
Process Clause’s requirement that people be given fair notice of what conduct is 
prohibited. In the first amendment arena, vagueness may have a chilling effect 
because a person does not know whether or not his conduct will ultimately be held to 
be constitutionally protected, so he may decline to exercise his right of speech. The 
other main function of the vagueness doctrine is to curb the discretion afforded to law 
enforcement officers or administrative officials.
The statute at hand would not be found vague under this standard. The statute 
is specific on what each of the terms mean and its application is clearly and carefully 
articulated. Therefore, because the conduct forbidden is not so unclearly defined that 
persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ to its 
application, the statute is not vague.
280
Tills Is evidenced by the fact that the statute would be ah anendnent to the Federal Election 
Campaign Act; it discusses candidates and its purposes involve promoting fair elections.
281 Connally v. General Construction Co. 269 U.S. 385,391 (1926).
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS
It appears that this statute would violate the first amendment to the United 
States Constitution.
The regulation of external imagery would not be a valid time, place and 
manner restriction because external imagery is compatible with messages on the 
television medium and the regulation of external imagery would not be content-neutral.
It is unlikely that the court would find the regulation to be a valid content- 
based restriction because a compelling government interest does not exist. The courts 
have taken a strong libertarian stance in their rulings on political advertising. Because 
of the strong protection given to political advertising, the availability of alternative 
sources of political information and the paucity of research on the actual effects of 
external imagery, the courts will likely find that preserving the rationality of elections 
is not a substantial state interest which would justify the restrictions.
The courts’ allowance of the liberal use of political campaign tools and the 
availability of alternative forms of communication to candidates would suggest that the
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problems associated with the expense of television advertising would not be a 
substantial state interest.
Finally, because television viewers are not a captive audience, external imagery 
in televised presidential campaign advertising does not raise privacy problems.
Therefore, there is no substantial state interest present which would justify the 
restriction of external imagery in televised presidential campaign advertising.
A . LIMITATIONS OF STUDY
There are two unavoidable limitations to this study. First, the use of the 
balancing test by the courts which weighs the relative importance of the conflicting 
values makes it difficult to predict how the courts would actually rule. This problem 
with the balancing test was articulated by Justice Black’s dissent in Barenblatt v.
United States.282 Black criticized the balancing test because the test often misinterprets 
the factors to be weighed.283 Until the matter goes before the Court, it is difficult to 
predict what weight will be given to the various interests involved. If the weights are 
shifted by the courts, the results of this study could be changed.
A second limitation of this study comes from the lack of research conducted in 
the area of external imagery. The research that has been conducted on external 
imagery in televised presidential campaign advertising merely suggests that external 
imagery has some power over viewers and that it is damaging rationality in elections.
282 360 U.S. 109 (19S9)(Black, J ., dissenting).
283 Id. at 144-145.
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If research finds concrete evidence of specific negative effects, then a substantial 
interest would more likely be found. If research were to find that no negative effects 
could be linked to external imagery, than there would be no substantial interest.
B . CONCLUDING REMARKS
It is possible that regulating external imagery in these advertisements might 
solve some of the problems currently associated with televised presidential campaign 
advertising by forcing candidates to provide information instead of relying on visuals to 
stir up viewer’s emotions. The increased flow of "hard" information would be 
consistent with the ideas behind the concept of rational elections.
While regulating external imagery through legislative action may appear 
attractive, it appears from the trends exhibited by the courts in ruling on political 
advertising issues that the libertarian notion of the "free-marketplace of ideas" should 
continue to control, even in the electronic age. This is the most desirable result. It 
is far better to have a flow of ideas free from government intervention. When we 
allow government to determine what ideas we are to be subjected to when making our 
political decisions, we run the ride of allowing government to determine what 
information is "good" and what information is "bad." This is very dangerous in a 
free society and it is especially offensive when the information presented deals with 
our political choices.
The best solution to the problems presented by external imagery in televised 
political advertising is not government intervention, but for the citizens and the press 
to take their duties of active involvement in political affairs seriously. This concept
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was at the foundation of our government and it should remain there.
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(» Sj ('. ‘J. (a) The <'undress finds and declares that—
7 <1) the costs of campaigns for Federal elective
S office1 have increased at such a rate and to such a point
A as to threaten both access to and equity within the po­
ll) litical process;
12
:i
4
5
0
7
H
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
10
17
18
19
20
21
oo**
23
24
25
2
(2) a principal reason for the increase in campaign 
costs is the growing dependence on the part of candi­
dates, parties, and interest groups on the use of televi­
sion advertising and, specifically, spot advertising, as 
the primary mode of political campaigning;
(3) such advertisements have served to frustrate 
the intent of the first amendment, obscuring rather 
than providing a full, fair, and rational debate on the 
merits of the issues and candidates:
(4) these advertisements may have contributed to 
declining political involvement, weakened political par­
ties, and negative t '*c attitudes toward the political 
process itself;
(5) television is a unique medium because of the 
limitations in points of access, the cost of such access, 
and the pervasiveness and effectivenes> of its reach;
(G) similarly, television advertising is unique in its 
effect and emotive content, being virtually unanswer­
able and less susceptible to the usual constitutional 
remedy of more, or more diversified, speech;
(7) both commercial and political advertising have 
been regulated in the past in light of factors of compel­
ling Federal interest; and
(8) there is, because of factors herein enumerated, 
a compelling Federal interest in regulating the manner,
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hut not the content, of political advertising through 
television, and to explore other ways to constrain the 
costs of political campaigns.
(h) The purposes of this Act are—
(1) to regulate the manner of presentation of polit­
ical advertising on television in order to reduce the 
costs of political campaigns,
(2) to strengthen the ability of citizens to make in­
formed choices between or among candidates for office, 
and
(3) generally to further the purposes of the first 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
AMKMIMKNT TO FE DERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT OF
197 1
Sec. 3. (a) The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
(2 U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 
323 the following new section:
“ t e l e v i s e d  p a i d  p o l i t i c a l  a d v e r t i s i n g  
“ S e c . 324. (a) No person may make any expenditure 
for the broadcast of any televised paid political advertise­
ment, unless such advertisement m eets the following 
requirements:
“(1) The advertisement may not contain any 
visual or auditory material other than—
41 “(A) the voice and image of the candidate or
2 alternative speaker speaking into the camera for
3 the duration of the advertisement, and
4 “(B) written material consisting of the
5 matter required hv paragraph (2) and the matter
]
6 permitted hv paragraph (3).
7 “(2) Each such advertisement shall contain—
8 “(A) an identification of the speaker;
9 “ (B) an identification of the candidate, if the
10 speaker is an alternative speaker who is author-
11 ized by the candidate to speak on behalf of such
12 candidate; and
13 “ (C) an identification, in accordance with the
14 rules and regulations promulgated by the Commis-
15 sion, of the person or persons who paid for the
16 broadcast of such advertisement.
17 “(3) Such an advertisement may contain—
18 “(A) an identification of the candidate’s party
19 and the office sought by the candidate,
20  “ (B) a statement as to whether the candidate
21 is seeking election or reelection,
22 “(C) a solicitation for contributions, and
23 “(D) hand signs, full text reproduction,
24 closed caption technology, or the like.
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“(4) The background or backdrop for any such 
advert isoment—
“ (A) shall be filmed, televised, or taped at 
the* same time and with the same camera as that 
filming, televising, or taping the candidate or al­
ternative speaker, and
“(B) must he the filming, taping, or televis­
ing of an actual scene or an actual event at the
time of such scene or event, and mav not includew »
any staged reproduction of any event or scene.
“(h) For purposes of this section—
“(1) the term ‘candidate’, with respect to a tele­
vised paid political advertisement, is limited to a candi­
date (as defined in section 301(2) of this Act) for a 
Federal office the election to which is influenced by 
such advertisement;
“ (2) the term ‘alternative speaker’ means, with 
respect to a televised paid political announcement—
“ (A) the chairman of any political party, or 
“ (B) if no candidate or authorized committee 
makes an expenditure for such advertisement—
“ (i) any individual who has made an ex­
penditure for such advertisement, or
“ (ii) the treasurer or chief executive of­
ficer of any political committee or other or-
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ganizution which has made an expenditure 
for such advertisement, or 
“ (0) an individual designated by a candidate 
or any person described in subparagraph (A) or 
(B), hut not more than one individual may be des­
ignated for any televised paid political announce­
m en t/’;
“(3) the term ‘televised paid political advertise­
ment’ means a paid political advertisement broadcast
bv means of television or direct satellite broadcast, or » w
transmitted bv cable television—%
“ (A) which does not exceed ten minutes in 
duration, and
“ (B) for which any person makes an expendi­
ture, and
“(4) the term ‘paid political advertisement' means
any communication which is made for the purpose of
influencing the outcome of any election for Federal
office, or for the solicitation of anv contributions.
9 %
“(c)(1) Any person who believes a violation of this sec­
tion has occurred may file a complaint with the Commission 
in accordance with section 309(a)(1) of this Act.
“ (2) For the purposes of taking action upon a complaint 
filed pursuant to paragraph (1), the Commission may act
41 wit limit regard to the tinir frames set forth in thin Act with
2 respect to —
3 “(At notificution of and response from the person
4 alleged to have cominittecl the violation set forth in
5 paragraph (1) of section 209(a) of this Act; and
(» "(Hi correction of violations hv informal methods
7 set forth in paragraph (4MA) of section 309(a) of this
8 Act.
‘.I “(3) If the Commission commences an action with re­
in  sped to *uch complaint under paragraph (4MA), (51, or ((>) of
11 section 309(a) of this Act. the aggrieved person may inter-
12 voiie as a matter of right as a party in the Commission
13 proceeding.
14 ‘‘(4) If the Commission fails to seek a permanent or
15 temporary injunction or a restraining order under paragraph 
1(1 ((1) of section 309(a) of this Act within five days after the
17 filing of a complaint under paragraph (1), the person who
18 filed such complaint may institute a civil action for relief,
19 limited to a permanent or temporary* injunction or a restrain-
20  ing order, in the district court of the United States for the
21 district in which the person against whom such action is
22 brought is found, resides, or transacts business.
23 “ (5) In any civil action instituted by a person under
24 paragraph (4), the court may grant a permanent or temporary
25 injunction or restraining order upon a proper showing that
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the person involved has committed a violation of this 
section.” .
(b) Section 306(b)(1) of such Act (2 U .S.C . 437c(b)(l)) is 
amended by striking out “T he” at tho beginning of the 
second sentence and inserting the following in lieu thereof: 
“ Except as provided in section 324(c)(4) of this Act, the” .
(c) Section 307(e) of such Act (2 U.S.C. 437d(e)) is 
amended by striking out “ section 309(a)(8)” and inserting in 
lieu thereof the following: “ sections 309(a)(8) and 324(c)(4)” .
(d)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), this Act and 
the amendments made by this Act shall take effect upon the 
date of enactment and shall apply to all Federal elections.
(2) The amendments made by this section do not apply 
to televised paid political advertising broadcast before the 
Federal election immediately following the calendar year of 
the date of enactment of this Act.
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